


**ARMY
INFORMATION
DIGEST**

FEBRUARY 1959



Chief of Staff Presents...

A
**FIVE POINT
PROGRAM
for
LIMITED WAR**
Page 2

THE OFFICIAL U. S. ARMY MAGAZINE



ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

THE OFFICIAL MAGAZINE of the DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The mission of ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST is to keep personnel of the Army aware of trends and developments of professional concern.

THE DIGEST is published under supervision of the Army Chief of Information to provide timely and authoritative information on policies, plans, operations, and technical developments of the Department of the Army to the Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. It also serves as a vehicle for timely expression of the views of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff and assists in the achievement of information objectives of the Army.

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MAINTAINING Army readiness for any emergency is a complex process calling for flexibility, versatility and relentless concentration on policies affecting strategic plans, weaponry and personnel. Reflecting this variegated task, in this issue the Chief of Staff enunciates a Five Point Program for meeting the challenge of limited war; the Director and the Deputy Director of Military Personnel Management outline current policies affecting officer and enlisted careers; and the Chief of Ordnance discusses the interrelationship of conventional and special weaponry. All are vital aspects of the Army's posture of readiness in the nuclear age.


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FEBRUARY 1959

Volume 14 Number 2

IN THIS ISSUE

Improving Our Capabilities for Limited War by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor	2
Army Information at Work by PFC Nigel Hampton	10
Advancement in the Army by Brig. Gen. G. R. Mather	18
Command Line	25
Two Years of Medicare by Brig. Gen. Floyd L. Wergeland	26
Missile Commands Included in Strategic Army Corps	31
Army Weaponry Blankets the Battlefield by Maj. Gen. J. H. Hinrichs	32
Army Officer Promotion System by Maj. Gen. R. W. Porter, Jr.	48

IN BRIEF

Military Reading Program ... 16	New Personnel Carrier 31
One Year in Orbit 17	Ordnance Officer Training .. 61
Pre-Commission Courses 24	Ultra High Speed Printer 65
Paragraphs from the Pentagon and the Field 61	

NEWS RELEASE PLEASE NOTE DATE



IMPROVING

— * * * —

GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

Chief of Staff, United States Army

delivered this significant address at the
Thirty-Fifth Annual Session of the
Institute of World Affairs,
Pasadena, California, 8 December 1958.



IN CHOOSING a topic for my discussion this evening, I have decided to talk about limited war, what it is, why it is important to understand, and what are some of the requirements to cope with it. This choice is made because of the recurrent debates over our readiness for this kind of threat which appear in current press and radio. In view of the complexity of our national strategy it is not surprising that there are some misunderstandings about the nature of the problems which deserve a few words of clarification.

At the outset, let me define general war and limited war as they are ordinarily understood today. General war would be a direct armed conflict involving the United States and the Communist Bloc in which it is probable that weapons of all sizes would be used with few limitations. It is depicted as an atomic fight to the finish by the two great power blocs.

If this concept of general war is accepted, the definition of limited war then becomes relatively simple—it is any military conflict short of a general war, one in which our national existence is not at stake. Thus, limited war covers a wide range of military operations, from a patrol action to armed combat on the magnitude of the Korean War or greater.

OUR CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED WAR

If I were asked why the growing interest in our ability to cope with limited war, I would say that it is because we have all noted the fact that they have occurred and are occurring — and in impressive numbers. In fact, a total of 17 limited war situations have arisen since 1945. They include a wide variety of military actions such as the Chinese Civil War, guerrilla operations in Greece and Malaya, the North Korean aggression, the Hungarian revolt, and the recent renewal of hostilities in the Taiwan Straits by the Chinese Communists.

Further, these have not necessarily been small or short wars. By striking a statistical time-manpower balance of all 17 limited wars, one finds that they have averaged about 2½ years in duration and nearly 600,000 men engaged. Often, a very significant military effort has been required to bring these limited wars to an end.

FIVE POINT PROGRAM

To Meet the Possible Challenges Posed by Limited War

- MODERNIZATION OF APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT
- IMPROVED STRATEGIC MOBILITY OF LIMITED WAR FORCES
- PRE-PLANNED USE OF AIR AND SEALIFT
- EXPANDED JOINT PLANNING AND TRAINING
- PUBLICIZING LIMITED WAR STRENGTH

Thus, in the past 13 years, there has been a notable incidence of active military operations short of general war. It is possible to pass from this fact to the inference that they will continue to occur and that the rate of occurrence may increase. This possibility arises from the fact that the Soviet leaders have always shown a willingness to take chances, even when they had no counterpart to our preponderant atomic strength.

With the rise in their capability in the atomic and missile fields it appears possible that we may expect increasing intransigence on their part. We may well be required to respond to increased levels of provocation in an atmosphere of heightened international tension. We have seen evidence of growing Soviet belligerence at the time of the Syrian crisis last year, in the situations in Lebanon and during the recent incidents in the Taiwan Straits—all of which have been accompanied by Soviet threats of nuclear devastation directed at our allies and ourselves. The renewed pressure on Berlin is another case in point.

The sobering thought that both sides now have the capability of destroying each other should nuclear weapons be used without restraint is a hard fact of life with which we are going to live for the indeterminate future. Meanwhile, the Communists are well aware of the very material gains they have made in the past through limited forms of aggression. Therefore, in exploiting the fear imposed by mutual atomic capabilities it would appear quite likely that they will henceforth undertake to kick us harder and higher on the shins

than they have done during the period of our atomic monopoly.

At such a time it is well to take inventory of our resources and ask ourselves if we have the wherewithal to cope with the threat of limited aggression. I shall speak now only of our military assets, recognizing that our national assets are truly wider than the military; that our national strength is an aggregate of political, moral, and economic strengths as well as of military resources. However, for the purpose of our discussion I am going to talk primarily about military matters.

Approaching the problem from the negative side, I should like first to point out the military assets that we have which do not contribute directly to coping with limited war. For example, the power of our atomic retaliatory bomber and missile forces is so destructive that it is difficult to conceive of a limited situation in which they would be applicable. I make this observation while recognizing that forces of this kind are absolutely indispensable to deterring that general atomic war which it is our primary purpose to avoid.

By the same token, our expenditures for continental air defense—the interceptor planes of the Air Force and the surface-to-air missiles of the Army—do not contribute to our limited war effectiveness, notwithstanding their necessity for deterring or surviving in a general war. The early warning systems, while justified by the requirements of general war, will have no use in lesser situations.

The Navy has a warranted concern over the submarine threat arising from the build-up of the

Soviet submarine capability. On the other hand it does not appear probable that antisubmarine warfare would play a significant part in a limited war. Thus, our assets in that particular field would not contribute primarily to a limited war capability.

Likewise, I would say that those activities which we group under the head of civil defense, although highly important and representing the expenditure of considerable money and effort at both Federal and state levels, do not contribute to limited war.

Indeed, most of our present atomic weapons systems may be of doubtful use in limited war, that doubt increasing in proportion to their destructiveness. In such wars, our normal role has been and probably will continue to be the provision of assistance to some friendly nation resisting some form of aggression. Under such conditions it will be important to rescue our friends with minimum damage to them and to their homelands.

FROM what has been said thus far, it is apparent that we have a very impressive list of military assets which do not accord in any great degree with the requirements peculiar to limited war.

That is not to say that we do not have important assets which are directly applicable to limited war. Most of the Army and a large part of the Marine Corps are some of our assets. However, I would not say that the entire Army can be counted as a primary limited war asset, for in addition to our participation in continental air defense I mentioned earlier, a significant portion of our combat forces are deployed overseas, particularly in Europe. There they are in-



volved in a defensive mission to deter or resist Communist bloc aggression in this area of deployment. While we can detach forces from Europe, as we did in the case of the airborne battle group which was sent into Lebanon last July, we would be reluctant to reduce our overseas deployment for use in limited wars outside their present location. The Army force specifically oriented toward readiness for limited war is the Strategic Army Corps, or STRAC, which is based in the United States, together with the back-up forces supporting its employment.

The Marines are also a definite limited war asset in their amphibious role. This fact was illustrated by their use in Lebanon, where Marine forces afloat moved in rapidly to seize the Beirut airfield and the port, preparing the way for Army elements coming in by air and water to expand the beachhead and to settle down for sustained ground combat if the need were to arise.

A great deal of the Tactical Air Command may be counted as a limited war asset, ready for rapid deployment overseas in similar



manner as our Strategic Army Corps. So may be the Navy carrier forces, which can provide air support in peripheral areas where airfields do not exist ashore. Likewise, the long-range air and sealift furnished by the Air Force and Navy by which Army forces can be strategically moved about the world are a very important part of our limited war resources.

To summarize, I would say that a large part of the Army, the Marines, the Tactical Air Command, some of the Navy's carrier forces, and the strategic airlift and sealift represent a rough tabulation of our principal limited war assets.

HAVING identified what we have to work with, we may then ask, "Do we have enough?" I will try to answer this in two ways; first by discussing some specific situations short of general war, which are now history, and then by reference to some studies of hypothetical situations. In combination, such an examination should give us some insight into the adequacy of our means. Although I am going to speak primarily about Army forces, from what I have said thus far, it should be clear that there is no suggestion that limited war is an Army monopoly but rather a problem which confronts all the Services.

KOREA is the most conspicuous example of United States experience in limited war. It is interest-

ing to reflect that the Communists could not have picked another spot on their periphery so favorable to U. S. military reaction as Korea. It was most fortunate that they chose an area in close proximity to our Japanese base, where we had forces — unprepared though they were — but at sufficiently close range to permit a rapid reaction. As we study possible areas of future limited wars, one doubts that the Communists will be so obliging the next time. In any event, although we did respond in time in Korea, it was clearly touch and go. We literally had to assemble our Army on the field of battle under the bullets of the enemy, and succeed in welding it into an effective combat force barely in the nick of time to avert defeat.

The most recent experience in operations of the small-war type was our expedition to Lebanon, mounted at the request of the lawful government of that country. This operation was, from a technical military point of view, quite successful. By dint of careful advance planning permitted by adequate warning, all Services responded rapidly and reached their destination in an acceptable lapse of time. However, in addition to the advantage of adequate warning, the operation was made simple by the absence of a shooting situation at destination. Furthermore the forces employed were limited in numbers. Thus, it is not prudent to draw general conclusions from

IMPROVING OUR LIMITED WAR CAPABILITIES

our successful experience in Lebanon.

BECAUSE of the limited experience derived from actual cases, the Army Staff has undertaken a number of hypothetical studies of possible limited war situations where the United States might be involved. From these studies coupled with the experience of actual cases, four major conclusions have been developed.

First, the reaction time of U. S. forces should be improved.

Next, this gain in time can be obtained in part by careful joint planning and training. Such training would include exercises involving elements of all Services to rehearse the organization, dispatch, and movement of task forces to destination.

Third, many logistical obstacles to strategic mobility exist, similar to those encountered in Beirut, where a single airfield and restricted port facilities limited the rate of buildup of our forces ashore. Often these logistical bottlenecks have been viewed in the past as insurmountable obstacles to strategic mobility. My response is that if the leaders responsible for the development of naval power two hundred years ago had accepted the conditions of the harbors, ports, and facilities around the world as they found them, we would not be able to project our naval power abroad as we can today. We have now the same problem for the projection of land combat power, in conjunction with its supporting air and sea components.

Finally, we have determined from these studies that our limited

war forces must have the most modern equipment. This equipment would include both conventional and low-yield atomic weapons and be characterized by lightness of weight and air transportability.

My conclusion then is that, although we now have a significant capability to cope with limited wars, we can and should take steps to improve it. So then the question becomes: "What should we do about it? What are these steps?"

MY VIEW is that we should embark on a "Five Point Program" to improve the capabilities of the Army and our sister Services to meet the possible challenges posed by limited war. The salient points of this program are:

- (1) the modernization of appropriate equipment;
- (2) the improved strategic mobility of limited war forces;
- (3) the pre-planned use of air and sealift;
- (4) expanded joint planning and training; and
- (5) the publicizing of our limited war strength.

IN speaking before the National Convention of the American Legion last September, the Secretary of Defense stated:

"Our Army has been undergoing a modernization program designed to prepare it for the stepped-up requirements of today's or tomorrow's possible war, not yesterday's. . . . This modernization program is by no means complete. We intend to push it vigorously."

In pursuance of Mr. McElroy's injunction, the Army intends to push

its modernization along the following lines:

Dollar-wise, our problem is not a simple one. Approximately 60 per cent of the dollar value of the Army's inventory of equipment was procured during World War II or the Korean War; 10 per cent of it is of pre-World War II vintage. As a result, many items have reached a point where they are no longer economical to maintain or are incapable of meeting "the stepped-up requirements of today's or tomorrow's possible war." As a result we need to include second generation missiles, light atomic weapons, improved conventional weapons, and many new types of air and ground vehicles to advance tactical mobility. To direct and control our units and weapons we require improved, lightweight signal communications based upon newly designed radio equipment.


The modernization of our forces will tend to support our second point: improved strategic mobility. As the Army lightens its loads, we hope that our sister Services will modernize the sea and airlift upon which we depend for our strategic mobility.

As a part of our program to improve strategic mobility, we need to determine the logistical bottlenecks to mobility about the world which I earlier mentioned and endeavor to eliminate them. These can often be minimized by the

forward stockage of supplies and equipment in critical strategic areas, to reduce the tonnages which must be transported in an emergency.

The third of our five points is the preplanning of the contingent use of a certain amount of air and sealift for possible limited war requirements. At present, the Army has no indications of the lift which would move its spearhead forces in an emergency. Some predesignation of air and sea elements for planning purposes would materially shorten the time required to get the initial forces on their way. The actual lift would not be released for use without the specific approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I do not suggest that such preplanning should cause a certain number of planes or ships to stand idle, marked "For Army Use Only." That makes no sense to me. However, it would make a great deal of sense if the Army knew in advance that in an emergency, a given amount of lift would be available at designated airfields and ports, ready for movement on JCS approval. This knowledge would contribute materially to realistic planning for the rapid reaction of our spearhead units to limited war situations. I should add that the possibility of effective coordination of such preplanning will be facilitated by the new Joint Staff author-



IMPROVING OUR LIMITED WAR CAPABILITIES

ized by the recent reorganization act of the Department of Defense.

In this phase of Defense reorganization, I would like to say that, in my judgment, this legislation and its implementation now in progress, represent a major step forward in the achievement of an organization better able to deal with the military exigencies of today and the future. One important use of the new Joint Staff should be directed toward the accomplishment of the fourth point of the Limited War Program; namely, expanded joint planning and training for limited war. Such joint action might include the checking and testing of plans for overseas movement of forces, the verification of their readiness, and the actual movement of token forces as training for emergency situations.

I should like to feel that we are as effective in meeting the complex requirements of limited war as SAC is in meeting the requirements of general atomic war. I think SAC is a most impressive military organization. Its complete dedication to readiness in its particular field is most impressive. I should like to find a similar intentness on the limited war problem.

The final point of the five-point program is to make clear to the world our readiness to react adequately anywhere to the challenge of aggression. To many observing America from a distance, we appear to be a country prepared to fight in case a general war should be forced upon us, but with unknown resources for a lesser response. It is highly important for psychological reasons to publicize our capabilities to react with

weapons and means short of those associated with massive retaliation. This evidence of readiness could be attained through exercising and testing our limited war forces.

Illustrative of what I have in mind was a small operation on a limited scale about three years ago in Thailand. We sent a joint airborne, seaborne task force into this area for the purposes I have described. The Army furnished an Honest John rocket unit from Japan, a Marine unit and Navy ships participated, as did planes of the Tactical Air Command. The task force was assembled in Bangkok in about forty-eight hours. This exercise made a very significant impression in Southeast Asia as a token demonstration of the reaction capability of American forces in that area.

IN CONCLUSION, I would stress again that I am not preaching a purely Army program. All Services would be involved in this five-pronged effort to improve our effectiveness in limited war. It is an essential extension of our national policy. We must overcome any impression that we are a country which can respond with a big bomb and little else.

Although we have significant assets now to cope with limited wars, these can and must be improved so that it can be made crystal clear to both our friends and foes that we can respond promptly with proper weapons and proper forces to any challenge. It is the purpose of the Army to develop its strength in such a way that it may play its indispensable part in presenting this flexible military capability to the world.

**Troop Information as a soldier sees it:
a dynamic force at the local level—**


ARMY INFORM

FOREWORD

IT IS AN AXIOM of military history that the success of any weapon or tactic ultimately depends on the courage, stamina and resourcefulness of the soldier who applies that weapon or tactic on the firing line. So too, the success of the Army's far-ranging information program depends in final measure on the motivation and enthusiasm of its spokesmen and supporters—the information officers, noncommissioned specialists, discussion leaders, unit newspaper editors and their staffs—who make the program a living reality for troops in the field.

FOR it is at the unit level that sparks are generated and interests kindled. Here the lively, imaginative application of materials made available under the Army Information Program can pay rich dividends—in individual pride and unit esprit.

THAT the Army program is evoking such a response is evident in the accompanying article, contributed by an enlisted information specialist who is also editor of a battalion newspaper overseas. Besides setting forth practical suggestions on methods of making the program more meaningful at the grass-roots level, the author imbues his discussion with the zest and enthusiasm which must be the touchstone for success in this program of such vital consequence to the Army and the Nation.



JOHN O. WEAVER
Colonel, GS
Chief, Troop Information Division

INFORMATION AT WORK

PFC Nigel Hampton

TO BE well-informed today is not a mere conversational luxury. It is a necessity born of our smaller, more complex world and our radically changing times; and for the soldier, it can mean faith in his country, pride in his uniform, and confidence in his attitude.

Information is a big job. It encompasses every communication medium affecting our lives, from our selection of tooth paste to the election of the President. It can be flagrant or subtle, but its effects are obvious.

We are informed by nation-wide television and over-the-back-fence chatter; we are confused by too much of it, harmed by too little, and constantly searching for more.

To call the Army Information Program vast is no exaggeration. It has to be. But it is not vast in the

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS NIGEL HAMPTON is an information specialist on duty with the 2d FA Battalion (RKT HOW), 16th Artillery, 4th Armored Division.

Sergeant Dispatch
79th Arty Par
Bureau Edition
54th MEDICAL GROUP BYSTAN
MEDAL AWARDED
KURE
THE TOMAHAWK
The Chronicle-Post
Belvoir Castle
Panorama
VOTRE BUSSAC
The Sentinel
THE MOUNTAIN

"The success of the Army Information Program, like the success of most endeavors, depends on one thing: interest—interest in being better informed yourself; interest that others should be—indeed, must be—better informed; interest that promotes interest."

empty-space sense; it is an all-encompassing program which must have immediate impact on every individual soldier to be effective.

Much time, money, and talent go into the Army Information Program and the maintenance of its standards of communicating information. Army publications provide concise, meaningful expressions of information and its objectives. Training aids created by the Army present information material clearly, simply and effectively. The entire information program is comprehensive in scope and specific in purpose; its united efforts have one job—to get the facts to the soldier.

And it is on the battery or company level that the program succeeds or fails. All the well-written publications, all the dynamic training aids, all the efforts of the many are wasted if the individual soldier does not "get the word."

HOW, then, can the Information Officer and his Information Noncommissioned Officers channel the tremendous responsibility of information—which bears down like an inverted pyramid with a plethora of facts and media on him, the point of the pyramid—and make the program work?

This responsibility can be delegated along the chain of command as mandatory. It can be presented verbatim by command. But the information program is a lot like teaching and salesmanship combined: if you don't believe it yourself, no one else will believe.

The success of the Army's Information Program, like the success of most endeavors, depends on one thing: interest—interest in being better informed yourself; interest that others should be—indeed, must be—better-informed; interest that promotes interest.

That word interest is the keyword of the program. Without it, nothing can be done; with it, anything is possible. When interest is applied to the Army Information Program on the local level morale skyrockets, teamwork becomes a reality, and disciplinary problems, usually caused by lack of information or misinformation, are reduced, if not eliminated.

Overall, there are less obvious but deeper results: The soldier knows why he is in uniform, and he holds it a privilege, aside from a duty.

MISINFORMATION and lack of information are prime factors in any morale deficiency. With the clear realization that there is a basic need to inform, we have our path clearly cut out for us. The soldier must understand his role, not only on the broad—and often vague—principles of military defense today, but right down to his specific importance in his job.

To understand this specific problem, we must seek specific, realistic approaches to the underlying causes.

ARMY INFORMATION AT WORK

At a weekly Troop Information discussion meeting, the soldier is bombarded by big ideas—the Code of Conduct, the Army Deterrent Force, Missile Support, Why NATO Exists—ideas so big that they often go right over his head. What does that mean to me, he asks—and he has a perfectly good right to ask.

He hears his discussion leader constantly refer to "the role of the soldier," the "Communist aggression we must stop," "the part you play in the Big Picture."

It is indeed a big picture—often too big for him to hope to understand in a brief TI meeting. More often the Big Idea serves no greater purpose than to kill his interest in the subject and his part in it.

Troop Information discussions don't have to be "so much talk about things so far away from me." That is not the purpose. Rather, it is their purpose to bring those "faraway things" close to home.

TO understand what *can* be done, consider this example:

The TI instructor in an artillery battalion stationed in Germany has his topic, "Our NATO Allies—France." He is furnished an information booklet and Fact Sheet. He will deliver a background lecture on the topic and *lead* a discussion.

So far, he has his topic, his instructions, his classroom and audience. These are supplied him, just as they are to every instructor. The difference between effective and ineffective results comes not in the materials; they are the best available. Rather, the difference centers in the instructor, his interest, and his approach to the topic.

The TI instructor is, regardless of his rank, a member of the very group he will lead. Their interests are his interests, and their problems are his problems. Thus, he has a good starting point in self-evaluation. He must ask himself, "Why should I be informed on this topic? How does it affect me?—me, not the Secretary of the Army, not the Chiefs of Staff. And how can I profit by this information, not just philosophically, but practically, right here and now?"

These questions alone provide a reason for the topic. If he must ask the questions of himself, he needs to know more about it. And if he himself does not know, his men need to know, too.

He has an opinion about "France," and probably one on "NATO," too. He sees can-can girls, the Eiffel Tower, and flags of friendly nations. But opinions are not enough. Generalized images are not enough. He must have facts and meaningful, specific pictures in his mind.

Here the information materials at his disposal prove a handy and reliable source. But interest, that all-important element of informing, must be the mold for his ingredients.

THE TI instructor realizes his need, utilizes his materials, and begins the preparation of his topic. All qualified instructors in all professions know the techniques of preparation, and they know that any topic must have importance to a particular audience at a particular time.

If the instructor can only find a point of association—to give his topic relevance to his group—he

"Watch the men pore over stale magazines and outdated home-town newspapers; listen as they gather in groups to hear any sort of news . . . There is an information void when these conditions prevail, and a good unit newspaper can fill that void."

is on the road to effective presentation.

Our hypothetical (though far from fictitious) instructor applies interest to his problem. He no longer sees France as an inanimate outline on a map or NATO as a building flying brightly-colored flags. He sees the French citizen, the French soldier, the NATO forces as human beings. And he is nearing a point of relevance, for we are all interested in other human beings, particularly when our interests are similar.

These "allies in NATO" are like ourselves: fighting for something they believe in. And to understand how much like ourselves they are, we look at their history briefly, take stock of their ideals, see them as allies in the broad sense of humanity, unbounded by geographical differences or language barriers.

Our TI instructor has discovered a reason for the topic, and a need for others to know. And as he searches further, his interest grows. He will now be able to convey that interest to his audience. Because he is enthusiastically interested in his subject, he will motivate interest in his audience.

If he continues to display this same interest in succeeding topics, as time goes by his audience, the

men who look to him for informative leadership, will develop a sense of recognition and respect. He becomes their link with the Big Ideas, their snapshot in the Big Picture. They will come to know better their own position as the human element of the Army, because their instructor—Information Officer or NCO—sees them as important. If it is so important that they should know, then they must be pretty important, too. And when they realize this, the overall Army program has meaning, down to the last private.

TI INSTRUCTION is only one way of informing the soldier on the local level. Supplementing, though never replacing, the spoken word is the written word; and the effective use of it can be a tremendous asset to any information program.

Excuses are easily invented for *not* having a battalion-level newspaper—Cost, Time, Effort. But offsetting and outweighing these is one overwhelming and compelling reason—the Need.

And you can be sure there is a need. Watch the men pore over stale magazines and outdated home-town newspapers; listen as they gather in groups to hear any sort of news, local or national or rumored. There is an information void when these conditions prevail, and a good unit newspaper can fill that void.

A good unit newspaper destroys the excuse of "Cost." Stencils and paper are relatively cheap, compared to the wealth of information which can be disseminated through them. And a good mimeographed newspaper doesn't have to

ARMY INFORMATION AT WORK

look like a junior high-school gossip-sheet; it can really be a *newspaper* in attitude and effect, regardless of its humble printing process.

True, a good unit newspaper will take Time and Effort. (If it doesn't, it can be marked off as a failure before it goes to press.) But with it, much can be accomplished.

It engenders a spirit of pride within the unit.

It provides positive information through a reliable source.

It assures that command policies are getting to and being understood by members of the unit.

It develops interest in unit activities, and makes possible better coordination with other units' activities.

It is, in effect, a tangible recognition of the soldier's need for information.

IDEALLY, the unit newspaper editor should be motivated along the same lines as the TI instructor. If he already has the interest, his task will be immeasurably easier.

He, too, is abundantly provided with the materials of the Army Information Program as an aid. He has publications on how to organize, operate, and maintain a unit newspaper—letterpress, offset or mimeo, depending on his funds and authorization. What he does with his materials will determine whether or not his is a good unit newspaper, worthy of its position and responsibility.

Like his civilian counterpart, the unit newspaper editor must realize that he has a primary responsibility to his readers. He owes them accurate, complete reporting of news of interest to them.

The unit newspaper is not his personal outlet for personal ideas, and if he doesn't realize it, his disgruntled readers will soon tell him.

His approach to his task, in this instance, calls for more than self-evaluation; this time a new element must be taken into consideration: general interest.

What is of interest to the editor may not be of needed interest to his readers. The editor who sees himself as a tool of the news will more nearly fulfill his role, rather than the editor who reverses the perspective.

And if many of his readers ask, "How did our team score in the Division playoffs? When is my income tax due? Where has the company commander been all week?" you can be certain the editor needs to measure his typewriter carriage—it's getting narrow.

The editor, like the instructor, must keep in mind that information which is tainted by his self-interest has the identifying characteristics of a self-portrait.

WITH the proper perspective established, a few detailed practical techniques may be employed to make the good newspaper even better. Some which have proved helpful in the writer's experience include:

Be on the lookout for feature material within your unit. Many a good story has been ignored because no one bothered to look for it. People are interesting, and the man in uniform is a good cross-section of humanity. Within one barracks the alert editor, or one of his staff, may find a former Little All-American, a big-name advertising man, a teacher of handi-

capped children, a prize-winning farmer. And despite humor to the contrary, there is very often a direct correlation between the soldier's civilian activities and his military duties—a good point for feature material.

Don't overlook the pulling power of "commercial" type make-up and content in the unit newspaper. There is a definite need for and interest in such regular features as a classified ads column (non-commercial, of course, and including a Lost and Found department); company or battery briefs (corresponding to a small town society-notebook column); book and movie reviews; a Question-of-the-Week or Roving Reporter type column, to get a wide range of names and opinions in the paper;

Interview-of-the-Week features on unit athletes or other interesting personalities.

WHETHER it utilizes the printed or the spoken word, the Army Information Program has the same importance as the men it seeks to inform. It demands the same individual attention. As the Army fails if the Man fails, so the information program fails if it does not get to the Man.

On the shoulders of the Information Officer or NCO rests responsibility for success of the program. It is a responsibility which demands action. By its very nature, information is motion through communication; it cannot remain static. And with interest, it lives and grows.

Keeping Current With the

CONTEMPORARY MILITARY READING PROGRAM

A synopsis of selected books included in the 1958 Army Contemporary Military Reading List of professional interest to Army members.

A HUNDRED YEARS OF WAR by Cyril Falls. Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1953. \$6.

In an historical analysis of strategy, armaments, methods and administration of war in the century ending in 1950, the author traces the revolutionary changes in material and technique during a century in which war was almost continuous.

SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE by Raymond L. Garthoff, Frederick A. Praeger, 283 pp. \$4.50.

Stressing the lessons which American military planners can draw from a thorough examination of what Communists are doing and thinking militarily in the areas of weapons, strategy and tactics, this work is based on lectures and personal studies by the author in Russia.

LIMITED WAR: THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STRATEGY by Robert Endicott Osgood, University of Chicago Press, 315 pp. \$5.

Bringing theoretical and historical insights to bear upon practical problems in contemporary American foreign policy, the author discusses how the United States can utilize its military power as a rational and effective instrument of national policy.

One Year In Orbit

JUST ONE YEAR AGO, the Nation was thrilled by the launching of the first Free World scientific earth satellite, Explorer I, sent aloft by Ordnance experts of the U. S. Army utilizing a modified Jupiter-C.

Since that successful launch on 31 January 1958, Explorer I has traveled more than 131,000,000 miles, circling the earth at a velocity of some 18,000 miles an hour. It is expected to remain in outer space for another three to five years, and although its transmitters now are silent, it still yields valuable scientific data by means of optical observation.

At the same time, Explorer IV which was launched 26 July, also with a modified Jupiter-C rocket, continues to circle the globe every 110 minutes, transmitting information about the radiation belt which has been found to exist in outer space.

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**The Army's new Enlisted Management Program
spells out far-ranging plans for**

Advancement IN THE



Brigadier General G. R. Mather

AS THE U. S. Army moves into the atomic and space age with the constantly accelerating technological advances of modern war-

BRIGADIER GENERAL G. R. MATHER is Deputy Director of Military Personnel Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army.

fare, the problem of retaining skilled Army manpower becomes ever more acute.

But simply to retain career soldiers is not enough. There must be inspiration and motivation for those highly skilled in military occupational specialties to advance themselves professionally. The Army's manpower training investment must be protected by maintaining the morale and esprit of enlisted leaders and technicians.

Achievement of these twin goals today is being greatly facilitated by the various career opportunities that have been evolved as the result of intensive studies during the



past two years and which are now consolidated under the the Army Enlisted Management Program.

Key element of the new program is the Enlisted Evaluation System which will provide a method of measuring enlisted personnel against Army-wide standards. On

the basis of test scores and evaluation reports set up under the System, information will be available upon which to base various personnel actions, including:

- Extra pay for proficiency.
- Promotion.
- Selection for training.
- Selection for special assignments.

In addition to these various applications of the Evaluation System, the Army Enlisted Management Program will:

- Aid in development of promising enlisted men by training and education at government expense.
- Provide for centralized assignment for the top two enlisted grades.
- Replace the current system of Regular Army branch enlistment options with enlistment options for occupational areas (two digit MOS).

The new program, when added to the improvements already effected during the past two years in the form of new housing, medical care, survivor benefits, dislocation allowances, and increased compensation, marks a significant advance in enhancing the attractiveness of the Army as a career.

SOME of the provisions of the Enlisted Management Program

"The Army will never be any better than the individuals who make it up. Every member of the Army has a part to play in this field of self-improvement. He must make himself a better member of the Army community and at the same time insist upon the maintenance of higher standards by his subordinates . . .

"Only an Army which is filled with first-class people can in the long run be itself first-class."

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, United States Army
in the January 1958 "Army Information Digest"

"Through the MOS Proficiency tests . . . every enlisted man meeting minimum eligibility requirements is given the opportunity to demonstrate his knowledge . . . The second major component, the Commander's Evaluation Report, rates each individual on the manner in which he actually performs his job."

have already been implemented, others are in the process of being worked out, while the entire program is expected to be in full operation within the next four years.

The Enlisted Evaluation System was developed in answer to the need for an objective system of individual evaluation of enlisted personnel. Work was initiated in 1957 on the new plan. Comments and recommendations of the Cordiner Committee, the NCO Symposium sponsored by that committee, and from field commanders at all echelons were solicited and evaluated for incorporation into the governing directives.

As now worked out, the system is essentially a method for measuring individual proficiency through an objective evaluation of all enlisted persons with the same grade and military occupational specialty. In other words, all individuals are measured and rated in terms of their accomplishments as compared with those of all others in the same professional areas, pay grade, and skill level.

Evaluation is accomplished through a Military Occupational Specialty Proficiency Test and a Commander's Evaluation Report.

The first measuring device, administered at post or installation level, demonstrates just how much each man actually knows about his job. The second, as the title indicates, is completed by the individual's unit commander, and is set up to provide a measure of the leadership and performance demonstrated on the job.

THROUGH the MOS Proficiency Tests, which are prepared by Army Service Schools, every enlisted man meeting minimum eligibility requirements is given the opportunity to demonstrate his knowledge. A separate proficiency test is prepared for each skill level. Each covers a comprehensive sampling of all subjects a soldier should know to perform in any duty position within his skill level, as outlined in the MOS job specifications in AR 611-201, "Manual of Enlisted Military Occupational Specialties."

In order that the program may provide a stimulus to those seeking self-improvement and on-the-job training, MOS Proficiency Test Aids are provided in the form of Department of the Army Pamphlets. They contain information on all facets of the testing program, including subjects to be covered and a list of study references. Because it is infeasible to provide every individual with personal copies of all study references, field commanders are urged to provide for group study in classrooms, libraries, or dayrooms.

The second major component of the Enlisted Evaluation System, the Commander's Evaluation Report, rates each individual on the manner in which he actually performs

ARMY ENLISTED MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

enlisted evaluation system

proficiency pay

promotion qualification score


promotion plan for E-8 and E-9

permanent promotion

centralized assignment policies

pre-induction aptitude screening

increased career attractiveness



his job. Used in combination with the testing program, it provides an additional measure of the man.

PROFICIENCY TESTING

EVERY three months, a Department of the Army Circular will be published announcing military occupational specialties in which Army-wide proficiency tests will be conducted during the ensuing fiscal quarter. This circular will designate specific MOS in which tests will be administered, and will indicate the personnel action for which the test results may be used.

Reference to applicable MOS Proficiency Test Aids, inclusive dates of world-wide testing sessions, and instructions governing disposition of test materials will also be included in the circular.

Commanders maintaining personnel records will then begin immediate screening to identify individuals who meet minimum eligibility requirements for taking the tests. More than one session may be required in order to complete testing of all eligible personnel. Following these paper-and-

ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

pencil tests, the answer sheets together with Commanders' Evaluation Reports will be forwarded to the newly established U. S. Army Enlisted Evaluation Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, where they will be scored.

PROFICIENCY PAY

FIRST use of the Enlisted Evaluation System will be for selection of the best qualified personnel in each MOS to receive proficiency pay.

Implementation of the proficiency pay system has begun, but it will require four years to complete. It will result in proficiency payments to about 15 percent of the total enlisted strength of the Army. A flexible plan, it is designed to award extra pay in those occupational areas where it is desirable to reduce turnover of skilled individuals who represent a large training investment, and to provide an incentive by awarding payments to the more proficient personnel in all eligible MOS. Payments will be authorized and awarded in varying numbers to all 3-digit MOS which are authorized personnel in grade E-4 and above.

Completion of the Commander's Evaluation Report and appropriate MOS Proficiency Test for each person is the first step in the award of such pay. The Enlisted Evaluation Center then computes a proficiency score for all eligible personnel within the same grade and MOS, then lists personnel by name, grade, MOS, and attained proficiency score. Based upon Department of the Army directives establishing the number of proficiency ratings by grade and 4-digit MOS, a cut-off score will be determined which will

indicate those who are eligible for award of proficiency ratings.

Proficiency scores for all personnel are recorded on individual proficiency data cards which are forwarded to commanders designated to conduct MOS proficiency tests. These data cards will be filed with the individual's personnel records.

Consolidated rosters by name, grade, organization, MOS and proficiency score by major reporting command or major unit will be furnished to major commanders, heads of Technical and Administrative Services and commanders designated to conduct MOS Proficiency Tests. These rosters will list enlisted personnel who are eligible for award of proficiency ratings in specific military occupational specialties.

PERMANENT PROMOTION

FOR those noncommissioned officers who make the Army a career, permanent promotions now are being made for the first time since the outbreak of the Korean War. These permanent grades are awarded only to those best qualified individuals who have proven themselves on the job in the temporary grade, thus giving the deserving professional soldier added recognition and a permanent status.

TOP ENLISTED GRADES

RECOGNITION of the Army's enlisted personnel who carry heavy responsibilities has been provided by addition of Grades E-8 and E-9 to the top of the pay structure. Positions which warrant these new grades are being carefully and systematically identified through comprehensive job evaluation and review of some 500 TOE's and 1500

ADVANCEMENT IN THE ARMY

TD's. Present plans are to advance at least 14,500 individuals to these two top grades during the next four years.

CENTRALIZED ASSIGNMENT

TO INSURE the timely and proper centralization of skills, and to enhance prestige of the top enlisted grades, the Army will centralize assignment of Grades E-8 and E-9 in a method similar to that now in effect for officers. Permanent changes of station of these noncommissioned officers, as one phase, will be controlled by the Department of the Army.

Part of the plan will effect a change in the previous policy that certain enlisted men with 20 years' service could remain indefinitely in the United States. Based on operational necessity, the new policy provides that soldiers will be subject to overseas assignment until their 27th year of service. Those already stabilized under past policy will retain this prerogative, but special provision is made to insure availability of the two top grades for oversea assignments.

JOB PERFORMANCE POTENTIAL

THE Army will continue separating from the service those soldiers who are unable to handle the complex jobs of a modern Army. During the past year, approximately 70,000 were given early discharges under an accelerated program. This action has already resulted in an overall improvement in the level of training, job performance, and behavior, and has caused a major upward trend in voluntary participation in elementary educational courses.

COLLEGE TRAINING

ONE of the aims of the Enlisted Management Program is to aid in development of promising enlisted personnel by further training and education. Beginning in January 1959, the volunteer entering the Army will have the opportunity of enlisting for a chosen occupation in which he can show sufficient aptitude. In addition to the many service schools available, career-motivated soldiers may now also apply for college-level training in technical, scientific, and managerial areas at government expense.

Since March 1958 when this opportunity was announced, the Army has received 1290 applications for college training of whom more than 130 are now in school or awaiting admission to colleges. It is expected that approximately 1200 soldiers will be admitted to college during the next four years under this program. (See "On to College," January 1959 DIGEST.)

PRE-INDUCTION SCREENING

PUBLIC LAW 85-564 permits the President (except during times of national emergency declared by the Congress) to modify standards for induction otherwise established in the Universal Military Training and Service Act. Under the implementation of this Act, registrants scoring below the 10th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test are rejected; those scoring between the 10th and 30th percentiles are further tested with the Army Classification Battery and those failing to score 90 or better in two or more aptitude areas are deferred. They remain subject to draft, however, in event

of a national emergency.

Army screening procedures were placed into operation in August 1958. It is anticipated that these new procedures will assist in developing a more effective fighting force. Considerable monetary savings also will be effected through reduction in number of discharges for inaptitude.

ENLISTMENT OPTIONS

By granting enlistment options for occupational areas—rather than branch options as at present—the prospective enlistee who can qualify will be provided with on-the-job or school training in the area of his greatest occupational interest.

Upon completion of training, his assignment will continue in the same type of work, wherever the need may be, without regard to branch. This program is in addition to that afforded high school graduates for guaranteed service school attendance. It does not change special options such as choice of oversea areas. Imple-

mentation of this phase of the Enlisted Management Program is scheduled to begin 1 January 1959.

IN THE final analysis, the responsibility for successful operation of this Army Enlisted Management Program belongs to every member of the Army. The Department of the Army must continually re-examine personnel policies to insure that they remain objective and effective. Field commanders must maintain standardized military occupational testing programs within their commands. Enlisted personnel, by active participation in the various programs, must strive continuously for self-improvement and advancement in the military service.

The Enlisted Management Program will reward competent soldiers of all ranks who possess the requisite amounts of initiative, perseverance and desire for self-improvement. This, in turn, will result in a better soldier and a more effective Army.

Pre-Commission Extension Courses

REVISION of the Pre-Commission Extension Course Program, designed for enlisted men, has been announced by the Department of Non-Resident Instruction of the U. S. Army Infantry School. Primary purpose of the program is development of selected male enlisted personnel to become second lieutenants.

The course consists of 18 subcourses for a total of 306 credit hours. Subcourses are based on and parallel the curriculum of the Officer Candidate Program at the Infantry School. At present more than 44,000 students are enrolled, of whom 20,800 are National Guardsmen, 13,800 Active Army members, and 9,400 enlisted Reservists.

Although the revised course is not specifically designed to be used as a vehicle for promotions within the enlisted grades, completion of certain subcourses will improve the military education of the individual concerned and thus better equip him for promotion and acceptance of added responsibility.

Participation in the program costs the individual nothing. Enrollment is accomplished on DA Form 145, which may be obtained from National Guard or U. S. Army Reserve schools, from unit headquarters, or most S3 offices. Applications should be mailed to the Commandant, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, ATTN: Director of Extension Courses.



COMMAND LINE

ON NATIONAL READINESS POLICY

" . . . within our over-all military structure we must have the means of dealing with the entire spectrum of possible forms of conflict. We must be able to apply these means with degrees of power. Our national policy calls for the use of nuclear weapons in any case where such use would be advantageous to us. This of course does not mean we *will* use them in every case. It *does* mean that we should be prepared to use them.

"Our national policy also envisages that we will fight an enemy, if we are forced into a war, on our terms and not on his. This means that we will not attempt to meet his masses of soldiers with masses of our own. We will meet him with superior weapons, equipment, techniques, and tactics. Above all we must have greater flexibility built into our forces than an enemy has in his."

*General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
before the Association of the United States Army,
Washington, D. C. 21 October 1958.*

ON DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES

"The deployment of Army troops in critical areas of Europe and the Far East is an essential part of our military posture in a period of tension—a ready deterrent to the opening of limited or general war. The picture presented by our ground troops standing shoulder to shoulder with our stalwart allies gives a feeling of solidarity, unity of purpose, and determination which can be achieved in no other way. It has an impressive effect throughout the world."

*The Honorable Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army,
before the New England Conference for Economic Development,
Boston, Massachusetts, 21 November 1958*

ON THE ARMY AS BIG BUSINESS

"The capital assets of the Army in real estate, supplies, equipment, and various holdings amount to over 50 billion dollars. It must meet a payroll of nearly 1,300,000 military and civilian men and women, some 40 percent of whom are in some 70 foreign lands. It operates about 100 Army-owned industrial activities and facilities in the United States, where it manufactures, stores, processes, distributes, and rehabilitates about 20 billion dollars worth of equipment and supplies. In general, the Army produces little for itself in these plants and arsenals but rather looks to American industry for most of its hardware. In the last fiscal year, for example, the Army placed over 1.8 million contracts with private industry, totalling more than 5 billions of dollars for goods and services."


*General Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff,
before the Quartermaster Association Convention,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 10 October 1958.*

ON PUBLIC SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING

"In the long run our military forces will never be better than they appear in the eyes of their countrymen. Increased pay, amplified fringe benefits, and the like are not sufficient to obtain the dedicated servicemen required in the long pull for our national security. In addition to these material things, they must have the respect and support of their fellow citizens."

*General Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff,
before the United States Conference of Mayors,
Miami Beach, Florida, 13 September 1958.*

*Payment of one million physicians' and
another 650,000 hospital bills is the record of*



**TWO
YEARS
OF**

MED

Brigadier General Floyd L. Wergeland

ON 7 December 1958, the Medicare Program observed its second anniversary. The Program, established under provisions of Public Law 569—84th Congress, provides certain types of authorized medical-hospital care from civilian sources for the 3,000,000 eligible dependents of uniformed members

of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Public Health Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey.

From the beginning, the Program has been administered in the Continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico by the Office for Dependents' Medical Care, which operates as a Class II activity under The Surgeon General of the Army. During the first two years of the Program, approxi-

BRIGADIER GENERAL FLOYD L. WERGELAND is Executive Director, Office for Dependents' Medical Care, Office of the Army Surgeon General.

mately one million physicians and 650,000 hospital bills have been paid.

The Office for Dependents' Medical Care has not paid these bills directly. Actual payment is handled by fifty-five organizations—Medical Societies, Blue Shield-Blue Cross Plans, and private insurance companies—who do this work for the Office for Dependents' Medical Care under non-profit contracts. They pay the bills, send them along to the Office for De-

practicing physicians, of every hospital in the United States, Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and of all the personnel in the uniformed services, and through them their 3,000,000 dependents.

These changes in the Joint Directive, of course, affected the basic instructions contained in the Joint Regulations of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Public Health Service, covering the Program.

For the first fiscal year of operation ending 30 June 1957, no spe-

CARE

pendents' Medical Care for checking, and are then reimbursed.

THE first two years of the Medicare Program have been filled with administrative problems. When it began, the Program was something new—entirely without precedent or guidelines. Within the first few months of operation, there were several changes in the Joint Directive—the basic administrative regulation for the Program—issued by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Many of these changes made it necessary to alter the contracts with the bill-paying organizations, and further required notification of the 145,000

specific amount was budgeted for the Medicare Program. The Services had absorbed the costs of the first fiscal year's operations in their over-all appropriations.

The first budget request for fiscal year 1958—\$63,600,000—was largely an estimate because there was little data available that could be used as the basis for a firm projection of probable costs.

Late in calendar year 1957, in accordance with the usual timing of the preparation of Government budgets, the Office for Dependents' Medical Care was directed to prepare an estimated budget for submission to the Congress in the Spring of 1958, covering fiscal year 1959. From available data, it ap-

ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

peared that the Program would stabilize at a cost averaging about \$6,000,000 a month—\$72,000,000 a year—and this is the amount that was submitted in the budget request for fiscal year 1959.

Late in the Spring of 1958, monthly expenditures began edging upward. It appeared that more and more dependents were using the Program, and that more and more delayed billings were being received.

This matter of delayed billings warrants explanation. From the start of the Program, it was anticipated that there would be a gap in time between the date on which a patient received care and the date on which the bill for this care was submitted to and processed by our fiscal administrators. No one knew what this time-lag would be.

Ultimately, experience showed that it was very much longer than anyone had estimated. It is now known that it takes upwards of ninety days to receive less than 60 percent of the claims for care provided in a given month. Further, it takes more than a year and one-half before receipt of substantially all of the claims for care provided in a given month. Even today the Office is still receiving a few claims for care given in December 1956, the first month of Program operation.

This lag in the submission of claims is crucially important, because it is from these claims that the Office for Dependents' Medical Care obtains statistical and financial experience data.

The Office is never in a position to know how many people are in hospitals at a given time. Only when the claims are received,

months later, do we learn the facts. This is a situation about which nothing can be done, since much of this information is inherently very much *ex post facto*.

WHILE the budget request was being considered by the Congress in early 1958, it became evident that the \$72,000,000 requested was probably not enough; monthly billings had begun to creep up toward \$7,000,000. This fact was brought to the attention of the Committee considering the budget.

During these budget hearings, the Committee expressed concern over the fact that the dependent patient load in service hospitals decreased after the Medicare Program commenced operations. It was evident that substantial numbers of dependents, particularly maternity cases, were using civilian hospitals under the Medicare Program when facilities and staff were available in service hospitals.

Accordingly, the House Committee decided to cut \$12,000,000 from the budget request of \$72,000,000, with the intent of restricting the free choice of dependents and requiring them to use service hospitals when such care could be provided. The House of Representatives voted to put a provision in the appropriation bill limiting expenditures for fiscal year 1959 to \$60,000,000.

The Committee on Appropriations of the Senate agreed with the House vote in recommending to the Senate as a whole an appropriation of \$60,000,000. When the appropriation bill came before the Senate for a vote, an amendment from the floor deleted the limitation of \$60,000,000 from the ap-

TWO YEARS OF MEDICARE

propriation bill. Eventually both the Senate and the House of Representatives agreed on an appropriation bill containing the \$72,000,000 budget for the Program.

However, it was not until late August 1958 that the two Houses completed their work on and passed the appropriation bill for fiscal year 1959.

Meanwhile, Program *expenditures* for services provided in past months continued to increase—\$6,300,000 in August, \$8,400,000 in September; \$9,200,000 in October—with the ceiling still unknown.

WHILE the appropriation bill was under consideration by the Congress, the Secretary of Defense appointed an interdepartmental committee to study the problem and submit recommendations for administrative changes which would insure optimum utilization of uniformed services medical facilities, with a concurrent reduction in expenditures for civilian care.

To prevent an eligible dependent from by-passing a service hospital on the way to a civilian medical facility, it was recommended that dependents living with their service sponsors would first ascertain whether the needed care was available at a uniformed services medical installation. If it was not, or if the facility was not within reasonable distance, a "Medicare Permit" would be issued allowing the eligible dependent to seek authorized care from a civilian physician or hospital.

THE Medicare Permit (DD Form 1251) must now be used by all eligible dependents living with their sponsors in the continental

United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, and must accompany the bill submitted by the civilian physician and hospital for payment. The dependent is furnished three copies of the permit—one for himself, one for the physician and one for the hospital.

While the permit is issued only when the requested medical care is not available at a uniformed services facility or the location of the dependent's residence renders it not feasible, it is *not* a blanket authorization for needed medical or hospital care. Rather, it indicates that the required care cannot be provided by a uniformed services medical facility and permits the dependent to seek care from civilian sources provided the required care is specifically authorized under the revised Medicare Program.

Accordingly, even if a permit has been issued (it may sometimes be issued by an individual who is not a physician), the new regulations provide that care from a civilian physician and hospital will be paid for under the program only if it is for *an acute medical or surgical condition* (except maternity care.)

THE new restrictions applying to maternity cases—for *wives living with their military sponsors*—are as follows:

(1) Women who were under the care of a civilian physician and who were in their second trimester of pregnancy (beyond the third month) as of 1 October 1958 will be permitted to continue such care from civilian sources and no permit is required.

(2) Women who were in their first trimester (first three months)

of pregnancy on 1 October 1958 and new cases of pregnancy are required to obtain their care from a service hospital, if such care can be supplied. If a service hospital cannot supply the needed care, a permit will be issued allowing the dependent to seek care from a civilian physician, with delivery performed in a civilian hospital.

No permit is necessary to obtain authorized care from civilian sources for those dependents who are *not* living with their service sponsors. Further, treatment for a bona fide medical or surgical emergency for both those dependents living with or apart from their service sponsors will be paid for

under the Medicare Program without a permit provided the attending physician will certify that a bona fide emergency did exist.

THESE changes in the program have been made for two purposes: (1) to insure that the facilities of service hospitals are used to the optimum, and (2) to reduce Medicare costs for civilian care to match available funds. As the Medicare Program proceeds, it is hoped that these goals will be achieved and that the Program will stabilize and then continue through the years to provide dependents of Armed Forces personnel with all the care they need.

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HITS THE
MARK ...



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MISSILE COMMANDS INCLUDED IN STRATEGIC ARMY CORPS

TWO U. S. Army Missile Commands—the 3d (Air Transportable) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 2d (Medium) at Fort Hood, Texas—are now included in the Strategic Army Corps (STR-AC), the Army's mobile "ready force" designed to meet the threat of limited war and potential trouble spots around the world. The addition of the missile commands, equipped with either conventional or atomic-warheaded Honest John rockets and Corporal guided missiles, provide ground forces of the United States and its Allies with tremendously increased fire power.

Other U. S. Army Missile Commands are the 1st (Medium) in Italy, and the 4th (Air Transportable) in Korea. Air Transportable Missile Commands, with a strength of approximately 1100 men, are normally composed of an Honest John battalion, an infantry element for security, and logistical support elements. The typical Medium Missile Command contains approximately 5,000 men

with a Corporal battalion, two Honest John rocket battalions, an armored infantry battalion, a sky cavalry battalion for target acquisition, plus support elements.

The Army's missile commands are designed to furnish accurate fire support, regardless of weather or visibility conditions. They cannot be deployed as independent units since no ground-holding capability has been included within their organization. Infantry units are included primarily for local security purposes.

Other major units composing STRAC are: Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; 4th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington; 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas; the 2d Infantry Brigade, Fort Devens, Massachusetts; the Armored Combat Command at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Meade, Maryland.

Aluminum Armored Personnel Carrier

AS PART OF the Army's modernization program to achieve greater land, air and water mobility, a new armored personnel carrier (T-113) is being made largely of aluminum. Capable of mounting either a caliber .30 or caliber .50 machine gun, the carrier provides ballistic protection comparable to steel covering. Reduced weight of the carrier lends itself to better air-transportability, produces better powered performance and requires less fuel.

The new vehicles, which soon will be transported on an experimental basis direct from the manufacturer to Army establishments, are pilot models for test by the Army Ordnance Corps and the U. S. Continental Army Command. They are built by Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation, San Jose, California. Although designed primarily to provide Infantry with armor-protected battlefield mobility, the new carrier can be used to launch rockets, as a self-propelled weapons or mortar carrier, an anti-tank missile carrier, ambulance, communications vehicle, command post vehicle, cargo carrier, or fire direction center.

From caliber .30 rifle to


Army Weaponry

Major General J. H. Hinrichs

WITH the United States Army assigned the role of standing guard on the frontiers of the Free World, early and decisive commitment of Army forces must be anticipated at any time and any place. We may be engaged in any type

MAJOR GENERAL J. H. HINRICHIS is Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Army.

of action: a demonstration of force, a "brush-fire," or an all-out war. Under such circumstances the Army's weaponry is of tremendous importance. Our combat units must have the arms and equipment—and obviously the men properly trained and organized—to apply the necessary amount of force to meet those conditions.



What should the weapons be? Rockets, missiles, and atomics? Yes—we must have them and be prepared to use them. But also we must have the "tried and true" so-called conventional weapons.

WHY do we need both the ultra-modern big and little bang type of weaponry, *and* the conventional?

We face the threat of the use of the full range of atomics against us. Also, we may face the necessity of using them against an enemy. But political, moral or military considerations may preclude their use. Nevertheless, the *threat* of atomics will pervade every battlefield of the future, so we must have

them ready for action. Hence we must insure that our Army is not only effective but superior in their use. We must reduce our vulnerability to atomics, while at the same time we must insure our ability to counter and exploit an atomic situation should it arise.

How do we counter and exploit an atomic situation? To illustrate, assume we use small-yield atomics on the enemy in the area to the rear of the line of contact. Let's assume a danger radius from point to burst of three miles. For a mile and a half from the point of burst, everything will be killed. But outside that circle, possibly 50 per cent of the battlefield, there



Simple, light M14 rifle, now in pilot-line production, will be rifleman's basic weapon.

to punch out enemy resistance, seize and hold the ground, and break through into his rear areas.

And what if atomics are *not* used? Then we are right back in the "conventional" arena, with small arms, artillery, and high explosive warheads as "musts." This is not to say that rocketry and missilery are dead under these conditions, but it throws a different light on their logistics, and tactical uses.

TO PROVIDE the necessary spread of weapons, and stay ahead in the race, Army Ordnance conducts a most progressive research and development program. While we have been in the forefront of the development of rockets, missiles, and special weapons, we have not ignored the requirement for continuing the improvement and innovation of our arsenal of conventional weapons.

This spectrum of weapons—ranging from the most advanced new types through the most simple, rugged, and mobile conventional types—provides the United

will be strong points and areas loaded with enemy fighting men and weapons.

We could use more atomics to clean them out, but the chances are that we could do a safer, better, and quicker job with our tubed artillery, high explosive armed rockets, our tanks, and our infantry moving up fast in armored vehicles with small arms and light weapons



A two-man team fires the 3.5-inch bazooka introduced during Korean War.

WEAPONRY BLANKETS THE BATTLEFIELD

States Army with the arms to meet the conditions discussed above. With the modern equipment developed and furnished by our sister Services, and our modern Ordnance, we deliver to the American soldier the finest tools of the trade—and he can use them!

Without either belaboring or belittling the Pentomic concept and divisional organization, I believe that we are still in transition, and that we are flexible enough in thinking and practicing our profession, to insure that we can not only survive but win on any battlefield in any type of war. But I want to emphasize that the fire-

power of every kind of weapon is going to be a decisive factor.

PERSONAL WEAPONS

WHILE the basic weapon of the infantryman is and will continue to be the rifle, highest Ordnance priority has gone into developing the equivalent of hand artillery to give the front-line soldier more devastating punch, allowing him to stop tanks and smash bunkers with weapons that require little more than a strong infantryman or two to put them in firing position.

Today the rifle carried by most infantrymen is the reliable M1, standard since 1936, but the Army has just announced adoption of the

WEAPONS OF THE RIFLE COMPANY—BATTLE GROUP

WEAPON	EFFECTIVE RANGE	HIGH EXPL.	TARGET	USER	REMARKS
RIFLES					
M1	600 yards		Personnel	Rifle Co.	M1 (Caliber .30) — standard rifle of most U.S. troops—to be replaced by M14, now in pilot production.
M14	600 yards		Personnel		
MACHINE GUNS					
Caliber .30	2000 yards		Personnel	Rifle Co.	7.62mm (M60) machine gun to replace three caliber .30's.
Caliber .50	2000 yards		Personnel		
M60 7.62mm	2000 yards		Personnel		
BAZOOKA					
3.5 in.	250 yards		X tanks, bunker	Rifle Co.	Introduced during Korean War.
RECOILLESS RIFLES					
75mm (M67)	1000 yards		X tanks, bunker	Rifle Co.	
90mm (T219)	600 yards		X tanks, bunker	Rifle Co.	90mm Recoilless Rifle now being standardized.
106mm	1500 yards		X tanks, bunker	Rifle Co.	Standardized as the M-40 rifle system.
MORTARS					
81mm	2500 yards		Personnel	Rifle Co.	
4.2 in.	4300 yards		Personnel	Battle Group	



New M60, a general purpose machinegun, will replace three existing caliber .30 weapons.

M14, which is simpler, lighter, and delivers more firepower. It will cut the number of small arms from four to one—replacing the M1 (Garand), the Browning Automatic (BAR), the caliber .30 carbine, and the M3 submachine gun. Due to budget limitations, however, it will be some time before this weapon is in general use.

When fitted with a heavier barrel, the M14 rifle is called the M15, which may serve as replacement for the BAR. Both models can be made semi- or fully-automatic. They will fire the 7.62mm cartridge which will be common to all NATO armies—a great logistical advantage.

The Army also has announced adoption of the M60 general-purpose machine gun to replace the three existing caliber .30 machine

guns. Also firing the 7.62mm NATO cartridge, it can be fired from the shoulder as a rifle, from the hip, from a bipod, or a newly-developed aluminum tripod.

RECOILLESS rifles give infantry the firepower of short-range artillery, with little more weight than rifles and machine guns. The new 3.5-inch launcher, an aluminum tube weighing about 15 pounds, fires an 8½-pound rocket armed with a shaped charge which spews a jet of metal particles through armor and inside the target, whether tank, bunker, or pillbox.

The 57 and 75mm recoilless rifles of the last year of World War II and of the Korean War have been supplemented or succeeded first by the 105mm and then by the 106mm



The jeep-mounted 106mm "BAT" can defeat any tank in existence today.

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Reliable and accurate, the 81mm mortar provides a hefty wallop for rifle company.



recoilless rifles. Firing deadly shaped charges, they will knock out tanks and barricades. The 106mm, of course, greatly outdistances earlier models in both range and power. Capable of defeating any tank in existence today, it shoots several types of projectiles more than 1000 yards, and is effective against personnel, gun emplacements, caves, and other targets.

Known as the "BAT," it weighs less than 500 pounds and can be transported by and fired from a jeep, as well as from the ground. The tripod has a wheel on its front leg so that the weapon can be moved like a wheelbarrow. It can be used in direct and indirect fire. Like all the new weapons, the 106mm BAT was designed to provide great destructive power, ample range and accuracy, and a maximum rate of fire with minimum weight.

BEFORE the advent of recoilless rifles and the bazooka, about the best thing the infantryman had which could be classified as an artillery weapon was the old reliable mortar. Simple to make and use, it has been credited with more casualties among front-line troops than any other single weapon.

In proportion to its weight, the


mortar is perhaps one of the most effective weapons the infantry has. After long neglect, it came back during World War I and now has been improved, especially in its ammunition. Its high-angle trajectory can be controlled to surmount obstructions that prevent direct line of fire, and the accuracy has been increased to hit a bull's eye target area.

The Army's mortars today include the deadly 81mm and the big 4.2 inch. As with most of its weapons, Army Ordnance has been working doggedly to make them lighter, more reliable and simpler to operate and maintain. Since World War II, the shell has been streamlined to give it greater accuracy and longer range.

ARTILLERY

TO BACK UP the infantrymen and supply heavy firepower at longer ranges, Army Ordnance developed new artillery and improved some of the old, to provide highly mobile guns and howitzers, and a modern family of tanks. These can serve with rockets and guided missiles in non-atomic warfare, or as vital supplements to battlefield atomics.

Many experts believe that artillery and tanks will never be out-




The towed 8-inch artillery piece, one of the large weapons now in hands of troops, can fire an atomic shell as well as conventional round.

moded entirely. On the battlefield of the future they must be closely coordinated in the battle groups of combined arms to keep them on the move and provide the power to hold what is gained in attack.

Our recent standard antiaircraft guns (40mm, 90mm, and 120mm) were effective and rapid-firing. But they are on the point of being, or already have been, superseded by still better equipment, both of the tubed variety for close-in defense,

Superior to World War II cannon, the 175mm gun, T45, is an extremely versatile weapon.



and by air defense guided missiles.

Other artillery weapons include the 105mm howitzer, 155mm howitzer, 8-inch howitzer, the 155mm gun, the new 175mm gun, and the 280mm atomic cannon. Each is designed to do its own type of job, from long-range destruction of enemy communications, fortifications and artillery, to the closer-in personnel and materiel targets. The 105mm howitzer has often been called the "work horse" of Army artillery because it is adaptable to so many purposes, at ranges up to 12,000 yards.

The 280mm atomic cannon is the Army's largest caliber mobile artillery piece, and can fire either conventional high-explosive or atomic shells. It is much more accurate at long ranges (up to about 20 miles) than any mobile artillery pieces developed before World War II. Although the complete unit ready to travel weighs about 85 tons, it is not much heavier than the older heavy artillery pieces and can cross bridges capable of supporting division equipment. The atomic cannon is now deployed with our field forces in Western Europe.

SELF-PROPELLED GUNS

THE increasing need for mobility and lightness has led to some new developments in self-propelled guns, particularly the M56,

FIREPOWER FOR DIVISION, CORPS AND ARMY

WEAPON HOWITZERS	EFFECTIVE RANGE	SPECIAL WEAPON	HIGH EXPLOSIVE	TARGET	USER	REMARKS
105mm	12,200 yards		X	Personnel concentration, bunkers, tanks, bridges, vehicles, & assorted strong points	Div. Artillery	105mm both self-propelled & towed.
155mm	16,300 yards		X	Personnel concentration, bunkers, tanks, bridges, vehicles, & assorted strong points	Div. Artillery	M44 self-propelled Howitzer (155mm). Also towed model
8 in.	18,500 yards	X	X	Personnel concentration, bunkers, tanks, bridges, vehicles, & assorted strong points	Corps Artillery	Can use atomic shell (8in).
GUNS						
76mm	17,000 yards		X	Personnel concentration, bunkers, tanks, bridges, vehicles, & assorted strong points	Reconnaissance Unit	Used on the light tank.
90mm	21,000 yards		X	Personnel concentration, bunkers, tanks, bridges, vehicles, & assorted strong points	Armor Units	Used on medium tank and M56 self-propelled gun.
155mm	25,700 yards		Personnel	Concentration, bunkers, tanks, bridges, vehicles, & assorted strong points	Corps Artillery	
175mm	35,000 yards		Personnel	Concentration, bunkers, tanks, bridges, vehicles, & assorted strong points	Corps Artillery	
280mm	35,000 yards	X	X	Personnel concentration, bunkers, tanks, bridges, vehicles, & assorted strong points	Army Artillery	Atomic cannon. Soon to be replaced by guided missiles.



Often called "work-horse," the 105mm howitzer can readily be air-dropped

a 90mm self-propelled assault gun capable of being airborne, to oppose enemy armor and carry out other assault missions in airborne operations. Mounted on a light, tracked, self-propelled chassis, it can traverse muddy, marshy or sandy terrain and snow. It provides a highly mobile and powerful assault gun for airborne units.

A more powerful self-propelled weapon is the M44, a 155mm howitzer, the Army's most mobile medium howitzer. While primarily an artillery support weapon, it may be used in an emergency for direct fire in support of advancing ground troops. It can be put into action more quickly than any other medium field artillery piece, either self-propelled or towed.

The M44 can cruise on the highway at 30 miles an hour and is one of the most rapid firing 155mm howitzers ever developed. The gun mount is equipped with a new hydraulic recoil system which reduces the recoil by two-thirds. This in-

creases the working space of the crew, permitting a greater elevating and traversing range than had formerly been possible on a self-propelled howitzer of this size.

We have recently developed a self-propelled weapons system in which the new 175mm gun is interchangeable with the 8-inch howitzer. When the 175mm gun is mounted it is the T235—one of the most versatile artillery pieces in the Army's arsenal. With the 8-inch howitzer mounted it is the T236. (We have an 8-inch atomic round, you will recall.)

Either combination is far lighter, more mobile, and has greater operating range than any of the previous comparable weapons. It can be transported by any common carriers, including aircraft. It can be emplaced in about five minutes, and has hydraulic-electric power to speed up the rate of fire. When we get enough of the T235-T236 weapons produced, they should replace several older types.



The M56 self-propelled 90mm gun is air transportable.

TANKS

BY 1954 the Army had rounded out its post-war family of tanks, which had been under development since soon after the end of World War II. This family includes the M41 light-gun tank (Walker Bulldog), the medium-gun M48 (Patton 48), and the M103, the first heavy tank ever produced in significant numbers in the United States. New models are being evolved.

The M41 light tank weighs 25 tons and is armed with a high-velocity 76mm gun. It can travel more than 35 miles an hour, can turn in its own length, and is able to negotiate a 60 per cent slope.

The M46, or Patton I, weighing just over 45 tons, proved to be much faster, incomparably more maneuverable, and more heavily armed and armored than the Soviet T34's in Korea. The M47, armed with a 90mm gun, a caliber .50 machine gun, and two caliber .30 machine guns, was better. Its successor, the M48, is probably the toughest and most effective medium tank in the world. The new M48's are equipped with a highly effective control mechanism, which makes it possible to fire the 90mm gun repeatedly on target while the tank is moving.

The new heavy tank, the M103, is the most powerful ever produced for the U. S. Army. Weighing about 60 tons, it is armed with a 120mm high velocity gun, to match any known tank gun in the world. It is also armed with two caliber



Troops in Korean battle action fire an 8-inch, self-propelled howitzer.

.30 machine guns and one caliber .50, which can be operated without exposing the gunners. Despite the tank's weight, its 810-horsepower engine develops a speed of more than 20 miles an hour.

NEW WEAPONS

FOR fifteen years our scientists and engineers have been developing new weapons which would



The 155mm self-propelled gun is one of artillery weapons designed for a wide variety of uses.



Equipped with highly effective control mechanism, the M48 Patton is probably the toughest, most effective medium tank in the world.

keep the Army abreast of the requirements of the new era of guided missiles, rockets, and nuclear explosives. The most spectacular have been the development of free rockets, and surface-to-air and surface-to-surface guided missiles, but our work in special weapons, though not publicized as much, has been very progressive. The first two operational missiles developed by the Army were the Nike-Ajax and the Corporal.

NIKE-AJAX is the Free World's first supersonic air defense guided missile fired from the ground to intercept and destroy an enemy plane regardless of evasive action. Nike-Ajax missile units have been stationed around vital industrial and strategically important areas of the nation for several years.

NIKE-HERCULES, the Nation's second land-based, surface-to-air, solid propellant guided missile is now being phased into our air defense system. It is capable of engaging and destroying aircraft at much longer ranges and higher altitudes than Nike-Ajax, and can be equipped with an atomic warhead. Built-in safety devices pre-

vent an atomic detonation at an altitude low enough to cause damage to the surrounding terrain.

CORPORAL, a surface-to-surface (artillery) guided missile, equipped with either an atomic or conventional high-explosive warhead, is capable of hitting tactical targets over 75 miles away. This weapon gives the field commander great power on the battlefield and enables him to strike targets deep in enemy territory. Using a liquid propellant rocket motor, it follows a ballistic trajectory during most of its supersonic flight to the target. Corporal battalions have been deployed to Western Europe.

HONEST JOHN is another new Army weapon which already has been integrated into our overseas combat units. Capable of carrying either a high-explosive or an atomic warhead, it will be used to provide close fire support in land combat operations. Since it has no electronic controls, it is simple to design and operate. The Honest John has a range similar to that of medium to long-range artillery, with one round delivering as much demolition effect on target as



Capable of flying much higher and farther, Nike-Hercules missiles, right, will supplement Nike-Ajax missiles, left.

several hundred artillery shells. Its self-propelled launcher is highly mobile—more so than conventional artillery pieces.

LITTLE JOHN is a rocket about 12 feet long. Simple in design, it uses a solid-propellant rocket engine, and has greater explosive power than heavy artillery. Its lightweight launchers and equipment are highly mobile and easily airborne. Little John has been issued to the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for training and development of combat techniques.

LACROSSE, a highly accurate general support field artillery guided missile, can also be utilized for close tactical support of combat troops in the field. An all-weather guided missile capable of carrying highly effective area-destroying warheads, it is accurate enough to destroy small strong points. It may replace or supplement conventional artillery.

SERGEANT, a new surface-to-surface guided missile, will eventually replace the four-year-old Corporal. This solid-propellant, 30-foot ballistic guided missile is greatly

superior to its predecessor in power, range, and accuracy; it can deliver an atomic shell deep into enemy territory, and is invulnerable to any known countermeasures. Possessing more mobility than Corporal, the Sergeant can be more easily stored, and can go into action more quickly. It is transportable by air and can be quickly emplaced and fired by a relatively small crew under almost any weather or terrain conditions.

REDSTONE, this country's largest surface-to-surface ballistic guided missile ready for operational use

A Lacrosse missile is prepared for firing tests at White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico.



ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

in the field, supplements and extends the range of the largest artillery cannon. It is able to deliver either atomic or high-explosive projectiles over 150 miles. Redstone troop units recently have been field tested at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, and dispatched to Europe where they will help bolster NATO defenses.

PERSHING is the solid-propellant ballistic missile selected to succeed the liquid-propellant Redstone. The new missile will be much smaller, lighter and more mobile than Redstone, and will give the Army a more versatile and flexible weapon for a battlefield of the future.

JUPITER is the land-based, inter-

ARMY MISSILES AND ROCKETS

WEAPON	EFFECTIVE RANGE	SPECIAL WEAPON	HIGH EXPLOSIVE	TARGET	USER	REMARKS
Lacrosse	Medium-Range Artillery			Same as artillery	Corps Artillery	Highly accurate, close-support artillery (under development).
Corporal	75 miles	X	X	Distant strong points & troop concentrations	Corps Artillery	
Sergeant	About same as Corporal	X	X	Distant strong points & troop concentrations	Corps Artillery	Sergeant to replace Corporal (under development)
Redstone	About 200 miles	X	X	Distant strong points, large troop concentrations	Army Artillery	Redstone now operational
Pershing	200 plus miles	X	X	Distant strong points, large troop concentrations	Army Artillery	Under development
Little John	Medium-Range Artillery		X	X Artillery	Division Artillery	Honest John and Little John are free rockets (Honest John now in use with troops).
Honest John	Medium-to long range Artillery		X	X Artillery	Division Artillery	
Nike-Ajax	High-flying bombers			X High-flying aircraft	Antiaircraft Units	Nike Ajax being supplemented and replaced by Nike-Hercules
Hercules	Much higher and farther than Ajax		X	X High-flying aircraft	Antiaircraft Units	
Hawk	Low altitude			X Low-flying aircraft	Antiaircraft Units	Hawk is being tested. Prototype in production.

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
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
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


Little John missile, top left, is powered by solid propellant engine. Honest John, just below it, is now in the hands of troop units. Sergeant missile at right is designed to replace the Corporal.



Designed to destroy low-flying attacking aircraft, the Hawk (above) is highly mobile. At right is the mighty Redstone, now deployed in Europe to bolster NATO defenses.

EXCESS OF
175 MILES




mediate-range ballistic missile developed by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, under a high-priority project begun early in 1956. Since the Air Force will use the missile, Air Force personnel began training on the Jupiter at the Army Ordnance Guided Missile School in February 1958, and the first operational missile has been turned over to them.

One of the Army's greatest needs is about to be filled by the new HAWK—a solid fuel guided missile about 17 feet long and 14 inches in diameter—which was demon-

strated with such spectacular success at White Sands Missile Range in June 1958. This newest air defense weapon carries a modern warhead and can destroy attacking aircraft flying at hedge-hopping altitudes. Hawk will fill the low altitude gap left in our air defenses. Besides defending fixed installations, it can be used with fast-moving combat troops in the field. It is also scheduled to be adopted by the Marine Corps for field combat.

Further in the future lie two anti-missile missiles—NIKE-ZEUS and PLATO. The former is being de-



veloped to provide defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Plato is being developed as a mobile anti-missile system designed for use overseas to protect United States field armies and installations, and those of our allies. It will fire a modified Zeus missile.

WITH this array of weaponry, it is apparent that the cost of fielding a modern army has been tremendously compounded since the closing days of World War II. But as emphasized earlier, the United States Army cannot afford not to

have the latest and best in a proper combination of the ultra-modern and the more conventional weaponry.

Reflecting this vital need, Army Ordnance today is stretching its available resources to the utmost to provide a wide spread of effective weapons from hand arms through big missiles. As never before, its arsenal must be amply stocked with modern arms which will enable it to cover the battlefield with pin-point, with mass, or with atomic fires, in keeping with the fluid conditions and changing needs of tomorrow's battlefield.

*Paths to professional advancement
are charted under the*

ARMY OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM

Major General R. W. Porter, Jr.

THE ARMY officer promotion system—a topic of perennial interest since the days of Caesar's centurions—continues today as a subject of personal and professional importance. With the establishment of well-defined career programs in the post-World War II period, the administration of the Army promotion system today has a profound impact on the long-range vitality and *esprit* of the Army officer corps.

The following article deals with *active duty* promotions (temporary and permanent) only. It presents the policies, purposes and procedures of the present promotion system, and also explores some of the complex problems inherent in its administration.


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BACKGROUND

DURING much of the Army's early history, promotion was a hit-or-miss matter. Before 1890, officers generally remained in the same regiment throughout their careers. As a consequence, promotion usually depended on the situation in each regiment, with the health and combat longevity of senior officers determining the promotion rate of junior officers.

From 1890 until after World War I, the Army employed a *branch* promotion system. Each branch was authorized a certain strength in each grade, to which promotions were made as vacancies occurred. The fortunate officers were those assigned to branches having the highest percentage of slots in the higher grades compared to the total officer strength of their branch.

By transferring from branch to branch to take advantage of a



more favorable promotion situation, some officers managed to advance themselves more rapidly than most, but not always with corresponding benefit to the Army as a whole. The branch system, moreover, was an important factor in generating and intensifying inter-branch jealousy and ill feeling.


During World War I, the branch promotion system was suspended in favor of temporary promotions in the "National Army". After the war, officers holding higher temporary grades were promptly demoted to their Regular Army permanent grades. A few years later, in 1920, branch promotion was abolished, and a single promotion list was established for the Army.

BETWEEN the two World Wars, when there were about 12 thousand Regular officers in an Army totalling about 120 thousand, many officers served as 1st lieutenants for as long as 17 years. Promotion was largely by seniority and everybody just grew old together. The few promotions resulted from vacancies caused by retirements, resignations, and other normal attrition.

When the rapid build-up of military strength began in 1939, it became evident that a wholly centralized promotion system would not work. There was need for simple and fast promotion policy that would place maximum reliance upon the judgment of the commander in the field.

During most of World War II, promotion up to the grade of lieutenant colonel, overseas, was largely decentralized to specified field commanders. This system put a premium on being "in the right place at the right time," as well as on individual performance. To be advanced, an officer had to serve in a position vacancy and demonstrate his ability in that position. Officers fortunate enough to be given opportunities to serve in higher-grade position vacancies were promoted more rapidly than officers who happened to be in commands in which appropriate vacancies were fewer.

This wartime decentralized temporary promotion system left the Army with a postwar "stretch" in regard to age and years of service in the various grades. The grade



(Active Army as of 30 June 1958)

ACTIVE OFFICER PYRAMID

structure was far out of balance with respect to the needs of a peacetime Army. Only in the grades of colonel and higher had the situation been centralized; authority for promotion to those grades had been retained at the War Department level. With all its imperfections, the wartime system was an effective and probably inevitable solution to the problems of its day.

PROMOTION SYSTEM ELEMENTS

BEFORE examining the existing Army promotion system in detail, let us consider the three factors fundamental to *any* promotion system—whether it be business, government or armed forces. These factors are DISTRIBUTION, FLOW RATE, ATTRITION.

Distribution determines "how many we can have." It means simply the number of officers in each grade at a given time. Grade

distribution, expressed graphically, always has the shape of a pyramid.

Three things determine the number of officers in each step of the pyramid — (1) The authorized strength of the Army; (2) The Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954; and (3) The Budget. These factors are, of course, interrelated; a change in one is quite likely to bring changes in the other two.

The distribution of grades for major and above, for example, is controlled by the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 which contains the allocations set forth in the table shown opposite.

While the Army's actual requirements in each grade are somewhat higher than these figures, it necessarily operates within these legal grade ceilings. As the table indicates, grade distribution for the Active Army is governed both by the authorized strength of the Army and by the Officer Grade Limita-

OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM

tion Act. In addition, the Department of Defense generally specifies a lower figure than the law allows.

Grade distribution for the Regular Army segment of the Active Army is controlled by still another law—the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. This law prescribes a formula for grade distribution based on a "percentage of authorized strength." In other words, whatever the *Regular Army* authorized officer strength, the total is distributed among the grades as follows:

Grade	Authorized RA Strength Distribution
General officers	* $\frac{3}{4}$ of 1 percent (Army list only)
Colonel	8 percent
Lt. Col.	14 percent
Major	19 percent
Captain	23 percent
1st Lt.	18 percent
2d Lt.	18 percent

* This is over and above the 100 percent total of the lower grades.

There is standing authority to exceed the prescribed percentages whenever necessary to allow all officers on the list who are selected for promotion to be promoted—

TO	ON COMPLETING
Lt Col	21 years of service
Major	14 years of service
Captain	7 years of service
1st Lt	3 years of service

Flow Rate, the second factor of a promotion system, refers to length of service in each step of the pyramid. An ideal flow rate would naturally be one in which every qualified officer advances through the grade structure at a known and standardized pace throughout his career. But flow rate can never be governed solely by what *ought* to be. Such influential realities as war and peace, and the expansion or contraction of authorized strength and military appropriations are also involved.

If the flow rate could be controlled without reference to other needs of the Army, each officer would remain in a given grade long enough to pass along his experience but not so long as to lose interest and initiative. He would reach the senior grades while still young enough for the physical demands of tough campaigning and the mental flexibility and stamina needed for leadership under emergency conditions.

Changes in the flow rate are naturally caused by changes in the number of officers in each grade, and the nearness of that number to authorized grade ceilings. When

DISTRIBUTION OF GRADES SPECIFIED IN OFFICER GRADE LIMITATION ACT OF 1954

When *total*
officer
strength is:

	This distribution is allowed as a maximum:			
	General	Colonel	Lt Col	Major
50,000	350	3,352	6,940	9,350
60,000	400	3,352	8,045	10,950
70,000	425	4,102	9,150	12,500
80,000	450	4,452	10,205	14,050
90,000	475	4,752	11,260	15,600
100,000	495	5,002	12,265	17,060
110,000	510	5,202	13,270	18,370
120,000	520	5,402	14,175	19,680
130,000	530	5,602	15,075	20,890
140,000	540	5,802	15,875	22,095
150,000	550	6,002	16,675	23,300

actual strength falls considerably below authorized strength in a certain grade, promotions to that grade are momentarily accelerated.

Sometimes the acceleration extends all along the line, as in the rapid expansion early in World War II. In that emergency officers flowed rapidly through the grade structure—if they happened to be in the proper spot, were qualified, and stayed healthy. A somewhat similar, though much lesser, acceleration occurred in the build-up of 1950 and 1951.

Now it is hoped that Army strength will become relatively stabilized for the long haul. But it is still almost impossible to set a definite flow rate through the officer grades based upon the *temporary* promotion system because it is so difficult to predict accurately very far in advance the distribution of officers in the various

grades.

Attrition—natural and forced—is the least pleasant factor in controlling promotion, but it is an essential factor. If nobody left the officer corps, and grade distribution remained the same, there would be no promotions.

Natural attrition results from death, disability or voluntary retirement and resignation.

Forced attrition results mainly from unfitness for the service or failure of selection for promotion.

Unfitness is determined by board action—and the officer corps has reason to be proud that so few of its members require such action.

Failure of selection does *not* imply general unfitness. There simply are not enough positions at each step to accommodate *all* the officers from the next lower step of the pyramid.

Thus some attrition is necessary

What policies apply in cases of non-selection under the "best qualified" method of promotion?

One obvious impact of modern technology on the Army has been the ever-increasing demand for only the most highly qualified leaders. The Department of the Army has reacted to this demand by instituting the selection of outstanding officers in advance of their normal time of consideration and by extending the "best qualified" method of selection for promotion to the grades of lieutenant colonel and major. While the use of this method of promotion selection provides increased selectivity, it could, through promotion attrition, result in the loss of many fine officers who were "fully qualified" for promotion. In order not to lose to the Active Army the services of such officers, a new definition of a promotion "passover" has been incorporated in a forthcoming revision of AR 624-115. Instead of simply being the result of not being selected for promotion, a promotion "passover" will be the result of being considered "not fully qualified" for promotion by a Promotion Selection Board.

This means that, in the future, an officer within a zone of consideration for temporary promotion to major or lieutenant colonel may not be selected and still not receive a promotion passover. No penalty is associated with non-selection as such. If his record indicates sufficient improvement, he may be considered "best qualified" by a future selection board. On the other hand, if his records reflect a decline in efficiency or a lack of progress, he may be considered by a future promotion selection board to be "not fully qualified" and subject to the penalties associated with a promotion passover. The Adjutant General will notify those officers considered "not fully qualified" by the Promotion Selection Board.

OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM

to support a reasonable flow rate. Stagnation is prevented by the mandatory attrition provided in the Officer Personnel Act for Regular and the Long-Range Active Duty Program for Reserve Officers. Regulars and Reserves who twice fail of selection to *permanent* lieutenant colonel and below are dropped from the service.

For temporary grades, the situation is somewhat different: here two-time failure to be picked as "fully qualified" will result in relief from active duty for Reserve officers—and in elimination screening (after the first non-selection) for Regulars.

Because of the small number of authorized spaces, and the increasing selectivity which is exercised as one climbs the grade ladder, no penalty is assessed for non-selection to colonel and the general officer grades.

GOALS

THE only valid reason for having a promotion system is to provide qualified officers in appropriate grades to meet the needs of the Army.

Promotion is *not* a reward for good behavior, for competent performance, or for long service. It is *not* a method of giving a pay raise or pat on the back. It is a method of meeting the needs of the Army for qualified officers in the appropriate grades.

This objective is best attained by a promotion system that:

- Provides career incentives sufficiently attractive to draw men of high caliber to the Army.
- Advances to the higher grades the best officers during the peak years of their effectiveness.

Everyone who knows my friends, Smith and Jones, agrees that Smith is much more efficient than Jones. Yet a selection board picked Jones for temporary promotion and passed over Smith. How come?

Different individual opinions, plus the board's vote, explain this seemingly illogical situation. Both of your friends had their entire records considered by the selection board, and those records contain matters that may not be known to you or other acquaintances of the officers concerned. It is a well-known fact that two people who have known a third person equally well for a long period seldom will have the same opinion of that person's qualities. The impersonal judgment of a selection board tends to average out these inevitable differences of opinion.

- Eliminates the ineffective officer as early as possible.
- Gives maximum equality of long-range opportunity to officers of all branches and specialties.
- Is administratively and financially workable.

THE PROMOTION PICTURE

THE big personal question—"When will I be promoted?"—often can be answered only by another question: "How many officers are needed in the next higher grade?" A more exact answer is impossible in the case of *temporary* promotion. For *permanent* promotions, a more definite answer can be given.

The *temporary* promotion picture has two distinct parts—the primary zone promotions (or normal promotion opportunity), and the "outstanding" promotion policy, recently introduced. Promotions in the "outstanding" category involve officers who are "be-

What is the difference between the "fully qualified" and "best qualified" methods of selection for promotion?

For "fully qualified" selection, all officers in the zone who are considered by the board to be fully qualified may be selected. If a zone has 1000 officers, for example, they might all be selected; the only limitation is the judgment of the board. They are not in competition with each other.

In the "best qualified" method, competition enters the picture. If there are 1000 officers in the zone, and the board has been instructed to select only 800, it must choose from the group of 1000 the 800 officers whom it considers "best qualified." At present, the "fully qualified" method is used for promotion through captain, the "best qualified" method for major and above. There are a few exceptions applicable to medical and dental officers, nurses, medical specialists.

low the primary zone"—that is, who have less service in grade than officers in the primary zone.

Temporary "Primary Zone" Promotions. Since the officer strength of the Active Army exceeds that of the Regular Army, temporary promotions bulk larger in the "big picture" than permanent promotions.

The legal basis for making temporary promotions is the Officer Personnel Act — "Whenever the number of Regular Army officers holding office under permanent appointments . . . is less than the number authorized in these grades . . . the additional number authorized in these several grades may be filled by the temporary appointment of qualified officers . . ."

" . . . Action under this subsection shall be taken on a fair and equitable basis, regard being given to seniority, age, and selection based upon ability and efficiency under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War . . . "

Since 1940, the basis for entrance into a temporary promotion zone has been principally *time in the next lower grade*. This criterion was departed from briefly in 1950, for Regular Army officers only.

The best grounds for appraising

potential for the next higher grade continues to be proven and proveable performance in the present grade. Temporary promotion, it should be emphasized, does not depend on guesswork, estimate of "personality," or "future top limit." Selection Board members ask only, "What did you do in your present grade, and what does your complete record show?" These standards apply to everybody. Everyone who has the required time in grade is considered by the selection board.

"Outstanding" Zone. It is anticipated that all officers will begin to compete for "outstanding" promotion consideration during the indicated year of service in grades as follows:

<i>For Promotion To</i>	<i>In Their</i>
Colonel	5th year as Lt Col
Lt Col	4th year as Major
Major	3d year as Captain

The promotions allotted this group are a small proportion of the total—15 per cent maximum of each selected list to colonel, and 10 per cent each to lieutenant colonel and major. Thus there is no reflection against an officer in not being selected, and no penalty is involved.

OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM

What can I do to boost my chances for promotion?

A more profound question might be: "What can I do to become more useful to the Army?" The Army promotion system is designed to find and advance to higher grade those officers who meet the requirements for "fully qualified" or who are judged in comparison with their contemporaries to be "best qualified." Thus anything that increases an officer's value to the Army at the same time increases the likelihood of his promotion, either in his normal turn or earlier.

Perhaps the most general but nonetheless vital action might be summarized as "giving one's best effort to every assignment." While diligent and conscientious performance of duty is the most obvious requirement, it is possible to become so immersed in the minutiae of day-to-day work that the mind stands still and the outlook narrows. It is largely up to the individual, using his own personal talents and inclinations, to guard against such "marching in place." It is up to him to keep part of his mind on the future; to request assignments that will broaden and diversify his total career experience; to prepare himself on his own initiative for the more demanding responsibilities that lie ahead. The Army will help him do all these things—by schooling and by appropriate assignments. But in the final analysis, he is the master of his own fate; his value to the Army—his chances for promotion—are largely self-created.

No special recommendations are necessary in order to be considered in the "outstanding" zone. The normal efficiency reports and other portions of the officer's file—academic reports, transcripts, and the like—provide ample material for evaluation. Moreover, rating officers may send in special efficiency reports, whenever warranted by outstanding performance of duty. All officers enter the zone upon

reaching the listed year in grade.

No "outstanding" promotions are made to the grade of captain because very few first lieutenants have had sufficient variety of assignments to permit an accurate estimate of their potential.

TIME IN GRADE

WHILE many officers may deplore the fact that they are spending a long time in grade, the im-

TO DEMONSTRATE how widely the flow rate can vary during an officer's career, consider the cases of these illustrious Army officers:

General Winfield Scott
Never a lieutenant
Captain at 22
Never a major (or Lt Col)
Col at 26
Brig Gen at 27
Maj Gen at 55
Brevet Lt Gen at 61

General Alfred M. Gruenther
Lieutenant at 19
Captain at 36
Major at 41
Lt Col and Col at 42
Brig Gen at 43
Maj Gen at 43
Lt Gen at 50
General at 52

General Scott, a general officer for 48 years before retiring at age 75, presents a vivid example of grade stagnation in the higher levels of the pyramid after unusually rapid advancement through the lower grades.

General Gruenther, a lieutenant for 17 years, is a striking example of mellowing in the lower grades and of unusually rapid advancement through the upper half of the pyramid. If a choice were possible, perhaps most of us would like our own careers to follow the flow rate pattern of Scott, on the theory that if one must stagnate in grade it is better to do so while wearing stars. The officers who at one time or another ranked just below Scott probably had a different view.

portant point is *not* the time spent in any *one* grade, but the balance of an overall career. In a way, the Army is subject to the law of supply and demand just as other forms of endeavor. If there is a need for senior officers because of the size of the Army and its missions, then naturally the necessity will be present for a promotion speed-up. The converse is true, of course.

In perspective, grade against years of service should be equated for an overall career pattern. Such a pattern based on a 30-year service career might look something like this:

Temporary Promotion at:

	Age	Years of Service
Colonel	44-47	23-24
Lt Col	38-41	17-18
Major	33-35	12
Captain	26-28	5-6
1st Lt	22-24	1½
2d Lt	21-23	

Permanent Promotion at:

	Age	Years of Service
Colonel	46-48	25
Lt Col	41-43	20
Major	35-37	14
Captain	28-30	7
1st Lt	24-26	3
2d Lt	21-23	

PERMANENT PROMOTION

PERMANENT promotion, as spelled out in the Officer Personnel Act, is based on promotion lists. The Army Promotion List includes all of the combat arms and Technical and Administrative services, except Chaplain Corps, the various units of the Medical Service, the

Women's Army Corps and professors at the United States Military Academy. This article deals specifically with the Army Promotion List. For the other lists, various minor modifications apply.

Vacancies in the various promotion lists determine—to a point—the promotions that can be made at any particular time. Regardless of vacancies, all 2d lieutenants found to be qualified are promoted to 1st lieutenant after 3 years of service; all 1st lieutenants to captains after 7 years of service; captains to major, 14; and major to lieutenant colonel, 21.

These are maximum figures. Actual time in the various grades may be less, depending on vacancies. Currently, the Army is moving toward a situation of "statutory service" in all grades. It has already been reached for permanent captain and major—7 and 14 years of service. The current 19 years' service before promotion to permanent lieutenant colonel will be phased to 20 during the next few years.

BY administrative action, the Secretary of the Army has put in effect a long-range plan to stabilize promotion opportunity to permanent colonel, Regular Army. Under the plan, by 1960, all permanent lieutenant colonels on the Army Promotion List will be first considered for permanent colonel during their 24th year of service, with promotion in their 25th year. Although vacancies govern promotions to permanent colonel, the selection rate (about 2 out of 3) has been set so that promotion opportunity will be given to all officers by 25 years of service.

OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM

This is a far-reaching step for all Regular officers of the Army Promotion List; it virtually assures consideration by the 24th year of service for most officers.

In summary, the Officer Personnel Act sets a maximum flow rate—the top limit for time-in-grade at any particular time—and it provides a retention feature so that the length of time spent in service is determined by the officer's permanent grade.

This would affect the individual officer as follows:

- If the top grade attained is permanent major, he must retire after 20 years.
- If the top grade attained is permanent lieutenant colonel, he must retire after 28 years.
- If the top grade attained is permanent colonel, he must retire after 30 years, or five years in grade. By present policy, this means 30 years of service for all colonels.
- The Regular officer *may* retire, for a good reason, after 20 years.

What is the significance of the promotion list number in the Army Register?

This number is your place on a seniority basis in the Regular Army only. It does not reflect your active Army seniority. Its primary importance is to determine when you enter a promotion zone for permanent promotion.

THE Armed Forces Augmentation Act of 1956 (Public Law 737 — 84th Congress) will certainly have an impact on the Army—but not on promotion opportunities for officers now in the Regular Army. It simply increases the Regular Army strength ceiling from the present maximum of 36,000 officers to 49,500—to be attained after 1 July 1963. (See "Augmentation in Retrospect," November 1958 DIGEST.)

The increase will consist primarily of integrating Reserve officers on extended active duty. They will remain in the temporary grades held at the time of their change in status.

My commissioned service on the promotion list dates from 1 January 1948, when I entered the Regular Army as a result of a competitive tour. My active duty before that date was "lost" in the sense that if I had waited until the Augmentation Program I would be placed higher than my present position on the list. This seems to be a serious inequity.

When you enter the Regular Army, you exchange one set of contemporaries for another. Moreover, the Army has had, not one, but several augmentation programs dating back to just after World War I. Each program had its specific goals, and was applied as equitably as possible consistent with the best interests of the service. Regarding your "lost" service time, it is worth remembering that a position on the permanent promotion list lower than your total actual service would warrant has certain off-setting advantages. This "lost" time could eventually be "recovered" in the form of an opportunity for longer active service under the terms of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. Moreover, when you come up for permanent promotion, your record will show more experience in more assignments than will be true of many of your contemporaries. This also applies to selection for service schools and other assignments. Augmentation makes you part of a larger career Army, in which you share a correspondingly greater opportunity for a satisfying over-all career than is possible in a smaller career force.

ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

What percentage of the second lieutenants commissioned in 1958 will reach general officer level?

Considering permanent promotions only, a forecast based on attrition from all causes follows:

Of each 100 officers commissioned in the Regular Army as second lieutenants:
92 will make first lieutenant
84 will make captain
72 will make major
64 will make lieutenant colonel
34 will make colonel
2 will make brigadier general

Some of the new Regular officers will be placed on the promotion list ahead of some officers already in the Regular Army; almost invariably, these will be officers who have been serving in a temporary grade higher than their new Regular Army grade. Moreover, their advanced position on the promotion list naturally means that they will leave the service before those officers with lower promotion list numbers. Present permanent flow rates and attrition

rates will not change; thus, Regular officers will be in the same relative position after augmentation.

GENERAL OFFICER PROMOTION

ADVANCEMENT to general officer grade is the longest—and, statistically, perhaps the most difficult—step in the promotion ladder. (See table, page .)

Selection methods for general officers are basically the same as those used for the other grades. Selection boards—representing all elements of the Army—are composed of members senior in both permanent and temporary rank to any officer in the zone of consideration. The Secretary of the Army approves the membership of these boards, and their instructions.

General officer selections are made during the last quarter of each calendar year. Three selection boards usually are employed. One considers selections for both temporary major general and permanent brigadier general; another selects temporary brigadier

I am on a recommended list for temporary promotion. When will I be promoted?

No one can answer this question with a specific predicted date. However, two basic factors are influential in determining what the answer will be: (1) Your place on the recommended list is governed by your date of rank in grade; (2) As vacancies occur, promotions from the recommended list are made in the order of listing.

The "cut-off date" included in each published list of promotions provides a useful basis for estimating "When will I be promoted?" For example, let's say you are a captain on a recommended list for promotion to major. Your date of rank is 5 October 1950. The current promotion order announces a "date of rank cut-off" of 30 September 1950. While this indicates that your promotion may be coming up "pretty soon," a more definite prediction is prevented by the two unknown factors: (1) Will the total authorized in your new grade remain the same? (2) When, and how many, vacancies will occur?

When many officers have the same date of rank, the order of precedence is decided by other factors prescribed in the AR on rank and precedence. When dates of rank are the same, precedence is governed by length of active Federal commissioned service. Your position on the recommended list is always determined by these standard measures. Obviously, the nearer you are to the top of the list, the more likely it is that the next batch of promotions will include you.

OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM

I know a Reserve officer who was selected for temporary promotion. A few months later his request for category renewal was denied. Aren't these two actions entirely inconsistent?

Promotion boards and active duty boards apply different criteria because their purposes are different. This officer was found to be qualified for promotion—the selection board was concerned only with that matter. The active duty board, on the other hand, evidently found that he did not meet the standards for retention in effect at the time his request was reviewed. It is quite likely that this decision was based mainly on the factor of branch and grade imbalance and requirements.

Before denying category renewals to officers of overstrength branches, the Department of the Army Active Duty Board considers their transfer to understrength branches. If his record had warranted it, this officer would have been asked whether he desired such a transfer. If he was not asked, it may be assumed that he did not satisfy the standards for category renewal in effect at the time.

generals; and the third selects permanent major generals. The permanent brigadier general board meets first so that officers not selected for permanent brigadier general, who retire mandatorily, may be given maximum time to make plans for the following year.

Most officers will first enter the temporary promotion zone for brigadier general around their 23d year of service at age 46 (based on a starting age of 23.) After this point, consideration is automatic up to the 30th year of service as long as they remain in the zone.

SELECTION BOARDS AT WORK

PROMOTION selection is primarily a human problem involving many intangible elements. Human capacity, ability, and potential are best evaluated by human beings. There is no substitute for the judgment and experience of mature, experienced officers, senior both in temporary and permanent grade to everybody being considered, who have themselves been "through the mill." That Army officers themselves agree that this is the best method of selection is evident in a recent survey, in which 92 percent

of all officers concurred in this point of view.

The Army's selection board system (for grades below general officer) stems from the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. Board members are carefully chosen; they must be senior in both permanent and temporary grade to all officers being considered. Membership must

I am a Regular Army officer. In 1950 Regulars and non-Regulars reached the promotion zone by different criteria. Regular Army officers entered the zone by promotion list standing, non-Regulars by time in grade. As a result some of my acquaintances who are Reserve officers, who were junior to me at that time, passed me by on temporary promotion. Is this likely to happen again?

Very probably not. The 1950 policy had a specific purpose: To bring the temporary and permanent grades of Regular officers closer together. This was achieved, to a degree. The use of different criteria for regulars and reserves in the same zone inevitably worked to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others. There are no current plans to base promotion zones upon different criteria for different components.

ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

be representative of the arms and services, with individual members chosen on a basis of their experience and background. No member may consider the case of an officer if, while sitting on a previous selection board, he has recommended passing over that officer.

The principle that "like begets like" is observed; it is felt that a group of high-minded, capable, unselfish board members will indeed select the best candidates.

Like a jury, a selection board is required to announce only its findings, not the reasoning which led to them. Unlike a jury, however, a majority vote is required, not a unanimous vote. Once when a major general wrote to ask General Omar Bradley, then Chief of Staff, why he had not been promoted to lieutenant general, General Bradley replied to the effect: "There were seven members of the board; it took four votes to be selected. You did not get four votes."

NECESSARY records for each board meeting are prepared by the Department of the Army Secretariat for Selection Boards. The Statistics

I am a Reserve officer. Although I was picked by the last selection board, I'm told it is tougher for a Reserve officer to be selected for promotion. Is this true?

No. Selection Boards evaluate the records of all officers by the same criteria. Incidentally, careful study of this matter was made by a highly qualified Reserve officer who had been called to active duty for that purpose. He examined all the available records, and observed the procedures of selection boards. His report emphasized that performance standards are applied across the board without regard to component.

tical and Accounting Branch of the Adjutant General's Office furnishes the rosters of officers within the zone of consideration. A letter of instruction to each board constitutes the charter upon which it operates and bases its decisions.


Each board is briefed at its first meeting by a general officer from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. General officer selection boards usually are briefed by the Chief of Staff or Vice Chief of Staff. Questions are encouraged, to clarify any details.

Each board then establishes its own details of procedure, within the framework of its letter of instructions and other guidance. For example, boards have been specifically cautioned against use of the Overall Efficiency Index (OEI) score in determining qualifications for promotion. The Board must base its final determination upon examination of the entire record of each officer.

MEMBERS of the board work quietly, unhurriedly, making notations on the vote sheet attached to each record. At intervals, the board recorder collects and records the votes. A member wishing to exchange views may ask for a discussion with his associates. Some boards even set aside a definite part of the day for such meetings.

A majority vote of the board is required for selection. When the list of those selected for promotion is finally published, all concerned may be certain that it is based on the firm bedrock of professional evaluation and judgment — the prime criterion in every case being "for the good of the service" and the security of the Nation.

Paragraphs from the **PENTAGON and the FIELD**



Nike-Hercules and Hawk Tests

Two air-defense missiles—one designed for high altitude interception, the other for low flying missiles that might come in low over the horizon—have met successful tests against extremely swift targets at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.

Successful interception and destruction of a target at an altitude of over 100,000 feet—more than 20 miles—was recorded during recent Nike-Hercules evaluation tests at the White Sands Missile Range. Hercules now has made many intercepts at ranges as low as 5,000 feet and up to 80,000 and 100,000 feet. It also has demonstrated effectiveness against targets flying at speeds above Mach 2.5 and against targets that have maneuvered violently. Some of these targets had capabilities beyond those existing in today's aircraft.

The Army's Hawk air defense missile system, designed specifically to attack targets at extremely low altitudes, was successfully demonstrated against the fastest flying target available for tests, a supersonic XQ-5 missile. The target,

powered by a ramjet engine, is capable of flying at several times the speed of sound. Hawk is designed to operate in the continental United States, and also as a mobile air defense weapon with Army and Marine forces in the field. It can be transported over unimproved roads or can be air transported by helicopter or cargo aircraft.

Wind Chill Data Charted

A chart designed to give commanders advance information on protection of troops against cold weather conditions caused by wind chill has been prepared by medical researchers of the U. S. Army Medical Research Laboratory, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Through issuance of cold weather clothing and equipment, cold weather training of personnel and the dissemination of meteorological forecast data, the chart is expected to prevent serious cold injury. The chart, a product of considerable research, is published as an Appendix to Department of Army Circular 40-33 and is being disseminated to commanders. It shows, for example, that if temperature is expected to be 35

Ordnance Officer Training Program

ARMY Ordnance Corps has launched a new indoctrination program, designed to encourage young Regular Army officers to choose Ordnance careers and help them develop into Ordnance troop commanders or managers of Ordnance activities.

With seventy-six officers now enrolled in the training program, including 19 at colleges or universities, Ordnance expects to have about 200 officers enrolled at all times when the program gets in full swing. About 30 per cent will be in educational institutions, the others in service schools.

The new training program, normally lasting three to four years, will follow four stages—orientation, consisting of a four-week Company Officer Indoctrination Course at Army Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; advanced education, consisting of one or two years at a civilian college or university; Ordnance development, including two or more duty assignments; and field service preparation, during which officers attend local troop schools for instruction in Ordnance field service operations.

Each officer will concentrate in a special field such as guided missiles, special weapons or ammunition, automotive or armament, with selection based on individual preference, background and education, and needs of the Corps.

ARMY INFORMATION DIGEST

degrees Fahrenheit and the expected wind velocity is forecast for about 20 miles an hour, the effect on exposed flesh would be the same as 38 degrees *below* zero with no wind.

Reservists in Test Role

Tests are scheduled to start in February in use of Army Reservists to augment Active Army Nike batteries during emergency operations. If successful, the assignment of reserve personnel for training with nearby Army units will provide a ready reserve mobilization force of missile specialists. Two active missile batteries in the Chicago area will be used during the test, which will continue about six months.

Safeguards Under Review

A Committee on Safeguards for Army Air Defense Weapons has been established to review safeguards at Army air defense sites. Following field trips to sites where Army Air Defense missiles are deployed, the committee will report its findings to the Secretary of the Army.

Research in Solid Propellants

The Army will join with the Navy and Air Force to initiate negotiations with four chemical companies which will lead to major research contracts for an integrated solid propellant program. The services are undertaking the project on

behalf of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The companies are American Cyanimid, Dow Chemical, Esso Research & Engineering and Minnesota Mining & Manufacture.

Guide for the Alaska Bound

Department of the Army Pamphlet 21-74 describing "Helpful Hints for Personnel Ordered to U. S. Army, Alaska" has recently been issued. Purpose of the publication is to provide military personnel and dependents with general information on which to base plans for travel to, and service in, Alaska.

Insurance Information

Details of insurance plans in effect for servicemen are spelled out in the recently issued *Armed Forces Life Insurance Handbook*, published by the Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, Department of Defense. The handbook is designed to aid military insurance officers in counseling members of the Armed Forces on their personal financial security and insurance needs. In addition to spelling out types of Government life insurance, Survivors' and Dependents' Benefits, Social Security, retirement, medical care, and provisions of the Contingency Option Act, it discusses various forms of commercial insurance and explains them in detail.

Special Warfare Courses

FOR the first time, an Extension Course in Unconventional Warfare is being offered by the Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 126-hour course covers background, organization and structure of Special Forces, Guerrilla Forces Logistics, Explosives and Laws of Land Warfare.

The Special Series-Psychological Warfare Extension Course complements the New Unconventional Warfare Series, but is not a prerequisite to taking the course. Applications may be submitted as outlined in DA Pamphlet 350-60.

ORIENTATION courses given at the Special Warfare School have been reduced to one week's duration to permit officers to take either the Special Forces or the Psychological Warfare Orientation Course on a one week basis, or both in a two week period. The next scheduled Psychological Warfare Orientation Course begins 8 February; the Special Forces Orientation Course on 15 February. Another Special Forces Course will begin 14 June, followed by the Psychological Warfare Course 21 June. Applications for attendance should be made as outlined in DA Pamphlet 20-21.

PARAGRAPHS FROM PENTAGON AND FIELD

Stand Up and Be Counted

To assist in carrying out the 1960 national census, each Department of the Army installation and each noncontiguous activity or subinstallation will be considered as a separate enumeration district, according to Department of the Army Circular 210-7. Enumerations will be accomplished by installation commanders or by representatives of the Bureau of the Census.

Awards to Army

Two awards have been made to Department of the Army—one the National Safety Council's Award of Honor for the fifth consecutive year, the other the National Association of Suggestion Systems annual award for the second consecutive year. Both were received by Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker at ceremonies in the Pentagon. The highest award of the National Safety Council was given for marked improvement in reducing frequency of accidents and resulting injuries in 1958. The NASS award is in recognition of the stimulus to employee participation generated by Project Paydirt which began in 1957.

Foreign Language Training

Designed to provide refresher training for military intelligence linguists, three new Army language training facilities will provide means for remaining proficient after an oversea tour. Under direction of CONARC, the first facility was opened last September at Fort Hood, Texas. The other two are planned for Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Training will include practice in speaking, supplemented by use of libraries, tapes and movies with foreign language sound tracks.

Radiation Training Aid

A "Radiac Survey Training Set" has been developed to help teach soldiers to detect tactical radiation. The device simulates radioactivity by use of radio transmitter and set of receivers, which are energized by radio waves. As the operator approaches the transmitter, the readings become higher, as would be the case in using a Geiger counter in a contaminated area. Developed by U. S. Continental Army Command at the Naval Training Device Center, it was tested during Exercise "Indian River" last spring.

Missile Training for NATO Allies

First classes of trained missile experts from Belgium and France recently were graduated by the U. S. Army Ordnance Guided Missile School, Huntsville, Alabama. This brings to five the number of North Atlantic Treaty nations whose pioneer missile units have been schooled at the "Space Academy." Sixty officers and men of the Royal Belgian Air Force and the French Army, thirty from each nation, completed their training of more than a year in the Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules missiles. Students from Italy, Denmark and Norway were graduated during spring and summer, 1958.

OCS Attendance

General policy and procedures governing selection of personnel for attendance at Officer Candidate Schools are contained in Army Regulations 350-50. The Regulations also cover appointment as Reserve commissioned officers of personnel who have successfully completed training.

TV Weather Reports

A unique closed-circuit TV system was used to pick up and transmit an instant weather picture direct from charts in base operations weather sections to Army and Air Force staffs during Exercise White Cloud, conducted in South Carolina last fall. Commanders watching the telecast could talk back to the weather briefing officer during the broadcast, enabling them to receive interpretive reports on weather conditions so important to any large-scale airborne operation.

Photography Contest

The United States Army, Europe will host the All-Army Photography Contest to be held in Nurnberg, Germany, 4-6 May 1959. Winners of the Army finals will be submitted in the 8th Interservice Contest to be held in June 1959 in Washington, D. C., with the U. S. Marine Corps acting as host.

Competition will be conducted in two groups: black and white, and color. Entries are to be submitted in one of five categories—portraits; sports and action; military life; scenic; and experimental.

All military personnel on active duty for 90 days or more may compete. Information and entry forms may be obtained at the Special Services office of Army installations.

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"BAT" Under Development

A wingless "BAT" which will still take to the air is under development by the U. S. Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The BAT is a rubber-tired version of a Ballastable All-purpose Tractor, one of two special tractors designed to meet the future vehicular needs of the Army Engineers. The two can be air-transported and air-dropped. To give them weight for bulldozing and prime moving jobs, they can be ballasted with always available dirt, thus providing twice the work potential of existing machines of the same size.

Front and rear sections of the BAT can be detached to permit insertion of different body configurations—cargo, shop unit, liquid transporter, earth auger or crane. When detached into individual loads, the individual sections can be carried by helicopters. The BAT also can be adapted to transport supplies and personnel.

Second of the new tractors is an all-purpose ballastable crawler, with a front loading ballast compartment to make it usable for transport of pod-type loads such as shop units, servicing and utility equipment. The ballast ejector can be used to load and unload palletized cargo.

Electronic Data Processors

A contract to build two medium-size, mobile electronic data processors, at cost of more than a million dollars, has been awarded by the U. S. Army Signal Corps to Philco Corporation, Philadelphia. The processors, called Logicpac and Basicpac, will be designed to meet Army field requirements under combat conditions. They are expected to be used in combat computation, control and support data processing. The units will be installed in all-weather shelters, 11 feet long, 6½ feet wide, 6 feet high, to make them highly mobile. Of rugged construction, their reliable components will minimize environmental factors such as extremes of temperature, humidity, noise, vibration, shock and dust.

Summer Uniform for Women

A new summer uniform for women members of the Active Army, National Guard and Army Reserve will be authorized for sale at the beginning of the 1959 summer wear season. Department of the Army Circular 670-30 describes it as a two-piece cotton/dacron, green shade 160, with matching garrison cap. Brown accessories will not be changed until changeover to black is authorized.

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Ultra High Speed Message Printer



FIFTY times faster than a news service teletypewriter—45 times faster than an average typist—20 times faster than the average person can talk—that's the performance speed of a new teletypewriter developed for the Army. The device can type at a rate of up to 3,000 words a minute, printing four full lines of text a second.


Developed by the U. S. Army Signal Corps and Burroughs Corporation, Paoli, Pennsylvania, it will usually be operated at a speed of 750 words a minute as the major unit in the Army's new family of teletypewriter devices—making up the fastest known military teletypewriter network in the world.

In the latest development, letters are shot at paper electronically by a bank of electrode "guns," each aiming its beam at a corresponding spot on the paper. The paper then passes over powdered ink and a heated roller, to appear a split second later as clear, readable text. The machine operates from standard code tape or can be plugged into radio or telephone circuits. It can also be used to type out calculations of new military electronic computers.

PERSONNEL POLICY FOR THE MODERN ARMY:

Officer — Page 48

Enlisted — Page 18



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